The expectations of the people have been frustrated by the unexpected obstinacy of the agents of wickedness, by a plea that was never made use of for the same purpose before, against which the known laws of the nation have provided no remedy, and which your lordships are, therefore, now called upon to overthrow.

That the nation calls loudly for an inquiry, that the misapplication of the publick treasure is universally suspected, and that the person mentioned in the bill is believed to be the chief author of that misapplication; that at least those who have squandered it, have acted by his authority, and been admitted to trust by his recommendation, and that he is, therefore, accountable to the publick for their conduct, I shall suppose, cannot be denied.

The nation, my lords, has a right to be gratified in their demands of an inquiry, whatever be the foundation of their suspicions; since it is manifest that it can produce no other effects than those of giving new lustre to innocence, and quieting the clamours of the people, if it should be found that the government has been administered with honesty and ability; and it is not less evident that, if the general opinion is well grounded, if our interest has been betrayed, and that money employed only to corrupt the nation which was raised for the defence of it, the severest punishment ought to be inflicted, that all future ministers may be deterred from the same crimes by exemplary vengeance.

Thus, my lords, an inquiry appears, upon every supposition, useful and necessary; but I cannot comprehend how it can be prosecuted by any other method, than that of proposing an indemnity to those who shall make discoveries.  Every wicked measure, my lords, must involve in guilt all who are engaged in it; and how easily it may be concealed from every other person, may be shown by an example of a crime, which no man will deny to have sometimes existed, and which, in the opinion of most, is not very uncommon in this age.

It will be allowed, at least, that on some occasions, when a favourite begins to totter, when strong objections are raised against the continuance of a standing army, when a convention requires the ratification of the legislature, or some fatal address is proposed to be presented to the crown, a pecuniary reward may sometimes be offered, and though that, indeed, be a supposition more difficult to be admitted, sometimes, however rarely, accepted.

In this case, my lords, none but he that gives, and he that receives the bribe can be conscious of it; at most, we can only suppose an intervening agent to have any knowledge of it; and if even he is admitted to the secret, so as to be able to make a legal discovery, there must be some defect of cunning in the principals.  Let us consider from which of these any discovery can be probably expected, or what reason can be alleged, for which either should expose himself to punishment for the sake of ruining his associates.