The great difficulty of the former method, a method certainly in itself reasonable and efficacious, arose from the necessity of receiving informations from the meanest and most profligate of the people, who were often tempted to lay hold of the opportunities which that law put into their hands, of relieving their wants, or gratifying their resentment; and very frequently intimidated the innocent by threats of accusations, which were not easily to be confuted.  They were, therefore, equally dangerous to those that obeyed the act, and to those that disregarded it; for they sometimes put their threats in execution, and raised prosecutions against those who had committed no other crime than that of refusing to bribe them to silence.

An abuse so notorious, my lords, produced a general detestation of all informers, or, at least, concurred with other causes to produce it; and that detestation became so prevalent in the minds of the populace, that at last it became to the highest degree dangerous to attempt the conviction of those, who, in the most open and contemptuous manner, every day violated the laws of their country; and in time the retailers trusting to the protection of the people, laid aside all cautions, at least in this great city, and prosecuted their former practice with the utmost security.

This, my lords, was the chief difficulty and inconvenience hitherto discovered in the law which is now to be repealed.  Thus was its execution obstructed, and the provisions enacted by it made ineffectual.  This defect, therefore, ought to be chiefly regarded in any new regulations.  But what securities, my lords, are provided against the same evil in the bill before us?  Or why should we imagine that this law will be executed with less opposition than the last?  The informers will undoubtedly be of the same class as before; they are still to be incited by a reward; and, therefore, it may be reasonably feared, that they will act upon the same motives, and be persecuted with the same fury.

To obviate this inconvenience appears to me very easy, by converting the duty upon licenses to a large duty upon the liquors to be paid by the distiller; the payment of which will be carefully exacted by proper officers, who, though their employment is not very reputable, pursue it at least without any personal danger; and who inform their superiours of any attempts to defraud the revenue, without being censured as officious or revengeful, and, therefore, are without any terrours to hinder them from their duty.

It has been asserted, indeed, that the price of a license is now so small, that none who are inclined to deal in spirits will neglect to secure themselves from punishment and vexation by procuring it; and that no man will subject himself to the malice of a profligate, by carrying on an illicit trade, which the annual expense of twenty shillings will make legal.

If this argument be just, my lords, and to the greatest part of this assembly I believe it will appear very plausible, how will this law lessen the consumption of distilled liquors?  It is confessed that it will hinder nobody from selling them; and it has been found, by experience, that nothing can restrain the people from buying them, but such laws as hinder them from being sold.