Sir, that the laws may be observed by the nation without daily violence and perpetual compulsion, that our determinations may be received with reverence, and the regulations which we establish confirmed by the concurrence of our constituents, it is necessary that we endeavour to preserve their esteem, and convince them that the publick prosperity may be safely trusted in our hands.

This confidence is to be gained as well in high stations, as in lower conditions, by large assemblies, as by individuals, only by a constant practice of justice, and frequent exertion of superiour wisdom.  When any man finds his friend oppressive and malicious, he naturally withdraws his affections from him; when he observes him advancing absurd opinions, and adhering to them with obstinacy incapable of conviction, he falls unavoidably into a distrust of his understanding, and no longer pays any deference to his advice, or considers his conduct as worthy of imitation.

In the same manner, sir, if the legislative powers shall, in making laws, discover that they regard any motives before the advantage of their country, or that they pursue the publick good by measures inadequate and ill-concerted, what can be expected from the people, but that they should set up their own judgment in opposition to that of their governours, make themselves the arbiters in all doubtful questions, and obey or disregard the laws at discretion?

If this danger may arise from laws injudiciously drawn up, it may surely be apprehended from a compliance with this proposal; a proposal that the operation of the law should commence eleven days before the law itself is in being.

I have, hitherto, sir, regarded it as a principle equally true in politicks as in philosophy, that nothing can act when it does not exist; and I did not suspect that a position so evident would ever stand in need of a proof or illustration.

We live, indeed, in an age of paradoxes, and have heard several notions seriously defended, of which some would, not many years ago, have condemned their abetter to a prison or a madhouse, and would have been heard by the wisest of our ancestors with laughter or detestation; but I did not expect that the most hardy innovator would have shocked my understanding with a position like this, or have asserted that a law may operate before it is made, or before it is projected.

That where there is no law there is no transgression, is a maxim not only established by universal consent, but in itself evident and undeniable; and it is, sir, surely no less certain, that where there is no transgression there can be no punishment.

If a man may be punished, sir, by a law made after the fact, how can any man conclude himself secure from the jail or the gibbet?  A man may easily find means of being certain that he has offended no law in being, but that will afford no great satisfaction to a mind naturally timorous; since a law hereafter to be made, may, if this motion be supposed reasonable, take cognizance of his actions, and how he can know whether he has been equally scrupulous to observe the future statutes of future senates, he will find it very difficult to determine.