It is useless to choose one’s words in writing of German diplomacy.  This is a base lie.  Austria arrived at her decision previous to sending her ultimatum to Serbia.  This momentous decision was, that Russia had no right to intervene in the quarrel, which means, in other words, that Russia had absolutely no right to speak or use her influence in a crisis affecting the destiny of the Slavonic peoples, neither had Russia any right to move in a crisis which would disturb the balance of power in the Balkans and in Europe.  It was merely these rights which Russia throughout the crisis endeavoured to establish; if they had been recognized there would have been no war.

In order to prove what the Austro-German standpoint was, and that from first to last never changed, reference must be made to the Austrian Red Book.[27] On page 24:  Sir Edward Grey was informed by Count Mensdorf on July 24th, “and I (Mensdorf) repeated to him (Grey) many times, that we should stick to that view.”

[Footnote 27:  Oesterreichisch-ungarisches Rotbuch.  Vienna, 1915.]

Page 25.  Count Czecsen in Paris informed French Minister:  “It is a question which can only be settled between Serbia and ourselves,” on July 24th.

On the same day the Austrian Ambassador emphasized the same point in an interview with the Russian Foreign Minister—­pp. 27-8.

During the evening Monsieur Sasonow had interviews with both the German and Austrian Ambassadors.  The latter telegraphed to Vienna:  “My German colleague at once pointed out to M. Sasonow that Austria would not accept any interference in her differences with Serbia and that Germany would also not permit it.”—­p. 29.

That gives the situation in its simplest form, and without making further quotations, it will suffice to cite the dates on which it was re-emphasized: 

  July 25th in St. Petersburg, p. 89
    " 27th " " " p. 101
    " 28th " Berlin by Germany, p. 116
    " " " London by Austria, p. 123
    " 29th " St. Petersburg, " p. 128
    " 30th " Berlin, " p. 130
    " 30th " St. Petersburg, " p. 131
    " 31st " Vienna, " p. 133
  August 1st " St. Petersburg, " p. 136

Moreover, no less a personage than the Kaiser’s brother confirmed this view.  In Prince Heinrich’s telegram to the King of England, July 30th, the following passage occurs:  “If you really and sincerely wish to prevent this terrible misfortune (a European war), may I propose that you should exercise your influence on France and Russia to keep them both neutral (in the Austro-Serbian quarrel).  In my opinion this would be of the greatest service.  I consider this a certain means and perhaps the only possibility of preserving European peace.”

Prince Heinrich expressed no hope that Austria could be persuaded to make any concession, but merely requested King George to exercise his influence to get Russia to accept a position impossible to herself and incompatible with the balance of power in Europe.