SOURCE: "The Nature of Moral Philosophy," in Philosophical Studies, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1965, pp. 310-39.

In the following excerpt, Moore disagrees with Westermarck's notion that moral indignation can be consistent from one individual to the next.

I should like, if I can, to interest you to-night in one particular question about Moral Philosophy. It is a question which resembles most philosophical questions, in respect of the fact that philosophers are by no means agreed as to what is the right answer to it: some seem to be very strongly convinced that one answer is correct, while others are equally strongly convinced of the opposite. For my own part I do feel some doubt as to which answer is the right one, although, as you will see, I incline rather strongly to one of the two alternatives. I should like very much, if I could, to find some considerations...