SOURCE: "Westermarckian Relativity," in Ethics, Vol. LII, No. 2, January, 1942, pp. 222-30.

In the following excerpt, Swabey assesses Westermarck's ethical relativism.

In his Concept of Morals¹ Professor Stace conducts a vigorous attack on ethical relativism, in the course of which he mentions, without discussing in any detailed way, Edward Westermarck's Ethical Relativity. Whatever difficulties there may be in Westermarck's denial of objective moral truth, it seems clear to the present writer that there is a considerable element of validity in what we may call "the emotional theory of moral judgment." This is, in general, the theory that the use of all such "ethical predicates" as right, wrong, noble, base, wicked, honorable, etc., is connected with the expression of certain specific "moral emotions," namely, approval and disapproval. These are the feelings of a real or imaginary spectator viewing actions in their respective contexts; it may be that the spectator is...