SOURCE: Glenn, John D., Jr. “The Behaviorism of a Phenomenologist—The Structure of Behavior and The Concept of Mind.” Philosophical Topics 13, no. 2 (spring 1985): 247-56.

In the following essay, Glenn argues in favor of the primacy of Merleau-Ponty's critique of scientific behaviorism in the study of his later development of phenomenology.

For some years, studies of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy tended to concentrate on his second book Phenomenology of Perception. Recently, interest has shifted more toward his later work—particularly the posthumously-published The Visible and the Invisible. In any event, less attention has been given to his first book, The Structure of Behavior.¹ I suspect that most readers of Merleau-Ponty still begin with the Phenomenology, and read the Structure, if at all, primarily in its light. This is understandable, but unfortunate; for although these two works are in general consistent with one another,² and the Phenomenology is broader in scope, the...