BookRags.com Literature Guides Literature
Guides		 Criticism & Essays Criticism &
Essays		 Questions & Answers Questions &
Answers		 Lesson Plans Lesson
Plans		 My Bibliography Periodic Table U.S. Presidents Shakespeare Sonnet Shake-Up
Research Anything:        
History | Encyclopedias | Films | News | Create a Bibliography | More... Login | Register | Help
Not What You Meant?  There are 35 definitions for Tornado.  Also try: Tor.

Tor (anonymity network)

 Print-Friendly
About 6 pages (1,836 words)

Bookmark and Share Questions on this topic? Just ask!
Tor
Image:Eff tor.png
Developer Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson
OS Cross-platform
Genre Onion routing / Anonymity
License BSD license
Website www.torproject.org

Tor (The Onion Router) is a free software implementation of second-generation onion routing – a system enabling its users to communicate anonymously on the Internet. Originally sponsored by the US Naval Research Laboratory, Tor became an Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) project in late 2004. The EFF supported Tor financially until November 2005,[1] and continues to provide web hosting for the project. Like all current low latency anonymity networks, Tor is vulnerable to traffic analysis from observers who can watch both ends of a user's connection.[2]

Contents

Overview

Aiming to protect its users against traffic analysis attacks, Tor operates an overlay network of onion routers that enable anonymous outgoing connections and anonymous "hidden" services.

Anonymous outgoing connections

Users of the Tor network run an onion proxy on their machine. This software connects out to Tor, periodically negotiating a virtual circuit through the Tor network. Tor employs cryptography in a layered manner (hence the onion analogy), ensuring perfect forward secrecy between routers. At the same time, the onion proxy software presents a SOCKS interface to its clients. SOCKS-aware applications may be pointed at Tor, which then multiplexes the traffic through a Tor virtual circuit. Once inside the Tor network, the traffic is sent from router to router, ultimately reaching an exit node at which point the cleartext packet is available and is forwarded on to its original destination. Viewed from the destination, the traffic appears to originate at the Tor exit node. Tor's application independence sets it apart from most other anonymity networks: it works at the TCP stream level. Applications commonly anonymised using Tor include IRC, instant messaging and browsing the Web. When browsing the Web, Tor is often coupled with Privoxy – a filtering proxy server – that aims to add privacy at the application layer. Not all Tor nodes are equal. They describe themselves with several flags: DIR, Running, Guard, Authority, Fast, Exit, Stable, Valid, V2Dir, BadExit, BadDirectory. To start with, there are Tor Authority servers which are usually Stable but do not act as an Exit Node. There are Tor Exit Nodes, and the ones with Stable IP addresses announce themselves as such.

Weaknesses

DNS leaks

As with many anonymous web surfing systems, direct DNS requests are usually still performed by many applications, without using the Tor proxy. Solutions such as the previously mentioned Privoxy or using the command "torify" included with the Tor distribution are possible solutions to this problem.[3] Additionally, applications using SOCKS5 – which supports name-based proxy requests – can route DNS requests through Tor, having lookups performed at the exit node and thus receiving the same anonymity as other Tor traffic. As of Tor release 0.2.0.1-alpha, Tor includes its own DNS resolver which will dispatch queries over the mix network. This should close the DNS leak and can interact with Tor's address mapping facilities to provide Tor hidden service (.onion) access to non-SOCKS aware applications.[4]

Traffic analysis

Steven J. Murdoch and George Danezis from University of Cambridge presented an article,[5] in the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, USA, May 8–11, 2005. They presented traffic-analysis techniques that allow adversaries with only a partial view of the network to infer which nodes are being used to relay the anonymous streams and therefore greatly reduce the anonymity provided by Tor. They have also shown that otherwise unrelated streams can be linked back to the same initiator. There have so far been no responses by the development team to this report, which on the face of it seems to destroy the whole aim of Tor.

Eavesdropping by exit nodes

In September 2007, Dan Egerstad, a Swedish security consultant, revealed that he had intercepted usernames and passwords for a large number of email accounts, by operating and monitoring Tor exit nodes.[6] On November 15, 2007, he was arrested on charges stemming from discovering and publishing this information. As Tor does not and by design cannot encrypt the traffic between an exit node and the target server, any exit node is in a position to capture any traffic which is not encrypted at the application layer, e.g. by SSL. While this does not inherently violate the anonymity of the source, it affords added opportunities for data interception by self-selected third parties, greatly increasing the risk of exposure of sensitive data by users who are careless or who mistake Tor's anonymity for security. According to Egerstad, "If you analyse the traffic, it's just porn. It's kind of sad."[7] He also pointed out that Tor is less secure than many users believe. "People think they're protected just because they use Tor. Not only do they think it's encrypted, but they also think 'no one can find me'. But if you've configured your computer wrong, which probably more than 50 per cent of the people using Tor have, you can still find the person (on) the other side."[7]

Etiquette and abuse

Because Tor is capable of anonymising arbitrary TCP traffic, it attracts its fair share of abuse. Routers maintain an exit policy of what traffic is and is not permitted to leave the Tor network through that node. It is possible to combat most major abuses of the Tor network using a combination of addresses and ports. Potential abuses include:

Bandwidth hogging
It is considered impolite to transfer massive amounts of data across the Tor network – the onion routers are run by volunteers using their own bandwidth at their own cost.
E-mail 
Anonymous usage of SMTP (i.e., outgoing e-mail) can result in spam. Consequently the default exit policy of Tor nodes rejects outgoing connections to port 25, the port most frequently used for SMTP.

Anonymous hidden services

Although Tor's most popular feature is its provision of anonymity to clients, it can also provide anonymity to servers. By using the Tor network, it is possible to host servers in such a way that their network location is unknown. In order to access a hidden service, Tor must also be used by the client. Hidden services are accessed through the Tor-specific .onion pseudo top-level domain. The Tor network understands this TLD and routes data anonymously to the hidden service. The hidden service then hands over to standard server software, which should be configured to listen only on non-public interfaces. Services that are reachable through Tor hidden services and the public Internet are susceptible to correlation attacks, and consequently are not really hidden. An added advantage of Tor hidden services is that, because no public IP address is required, services may be hosted behind firewalls and NAT.

Central sites

The following links only work for web browsers that have Tor installed and enabled. Due to the nature of the network, access to links are dependent on the nodes you are connected to as well as those your tor software queries during each access attempt. As a result, it may take several tries to access these sites. Also, due to the anonymous nature of this network, sensitive material, which may be illegal in one's jurisdiction or simply distasteful, is posted more commonly than on the general Internet.
  • core.onion, a simple site containing links to other .onion sites, a simple forum and a comment system.
  • The Hidden Wiki, a popular wiki-based index site.

In popular culture

  • Smallville, Season 7, "Lara", Kara Kent (Supergirl) tells Jimmy Olsen she used Torpark to hide her tracks breaking into secret government computers.[8]

See also

 Free software Portal
Cryptography Portal

References

  1. ^ Tor:People (2006-10-15). Retrieved on 2007-05-21.
  2. ^ TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ. Retrieved on 2007-09-18. “Tor (like all current practical low-latency anonymity designs) fails when the attacker can see both ends of the communications channel”
  3. ^ TheOnionRouter/TorifyHOWTO - Noreply Wiki. Retrieved on 2007-04-19.
  4. ^ Tor Changelog. Retrieved on 2007-09-11.
  5. ^ Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor (PDF) (2006-01-19). Retrieved on 2007-05-21.
  6. ^ Wired: Rogue Nodes Turn Tor Anonymizer Into Eavesdropper's Paradise. Retrieved on 2007-09-16.
  7. ^ a b "The Hack of the Year", The Syndey Morning Herald, 2007-11-13. Retrieved on 2007-11-16. 
  8. ^ Transcript of "Lara", Season 7, Smallville "Not after running it through a torpark filter and rerouting it through half a dozen servers." Retrieved 2007-11-04.

External links

Wikinews has related news:
German police seize Tor anonymity servers

Articles

View More Summaries on Tor (anonymity network)
 
View all | View only answered questions | View only unanswered questions
Ask any question on Tor (anonymity network) and get it answered FAST!
Answer questions in BookRags Q&A and earn points toward
discounted or even FREE Study Guides and other BookRags products!
Learn more about BookRags Q&A
Copyrights
Tor (anonymity network) from Wíkipedia. ©2006 by Wíkipedia. Licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. View a list of authors or edit this article.

Article Navigation
Join BookRagslearn moreJoin BookRags
About BookRags | Customer Service | Report an Error | Terms of Use | Privacy Policy |