- For other meanings of the term realism, see realism (disambiguation).
Naïve realism is a common sense theory of perception. Most people, until they start reflecting philosophically, are naïve realists. This theory is also known as "direct realism" or "common sense realism". Naïve realism claims that the world is pretty much as common sense would have it. All objects are composed of matter, they occupy space, and have properties such as size, shape, texture, smell, taste and colour. These properties are usually perceived correctly. So, when we look at and touch things we see and feel those things directly, and so perceive them as they really are. Objects continue to obey the laws of physics and retain all their properties whether or not there is anyone present to observe them doing so. Naïve realism is distinct from scientific realism. Scientific realism says the universe really contains just those properties which feature in a scientific description of it, and so does not contain properties like colour per se, but merely objects that reflect certain wavelengths owing to their microscopic surface texture. The naïve realist, on the other hand, would say that objects really do possess the colours we perceive them to have. An example of a scientific realist is John Locke, who held the world only contains the primary qualities that feature in a corpuscularian scientific account of the world (see corpuscular theory), and that other properties were entirely subjective, depending for their existence upon some perceiver who can observe the objects.
Problems with this theory
Naïve realism is often attacked with the argument from conflicting appearances (see, for example, Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy). The same object may appear differently to different people, or to the same person at different times. The apples may appear to be red in the daytime, but at dusk they are a shade of grey. Therefore, the apple cannot be really (or inherently, or objectively) red, but only appears red under certain conditions of perception. However, the problem of conflicting appearances has been dismissed by some critics (for example, see Myles Burnyeat's article Conflicting Appearances) as no problem at all. To say that something cannot really possess a property if it appears different at different times, from different perspectives and under different conditions is logically equivalent to saying that something cannot really possess a property unless it always appears to possess that property. Therefore we would have to conclude that a stick that was really straight would have to, under all conditions and at all times, look straight. But clearly this is false; everyone would accept that straight sticks can look bent in water (owing to refraction), but no one thinks that this is because sticks aren't really straight. Thus the argument from conflicting appearances is invalid.
Further Reading
Nelson, Quee, The Slightest Philosophy (Dog's Ear Publishing, 2007), 276pp.
