| November 1994 Battle of Grozny | |||||||
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| Part of First Chechen War | |||||||
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| Combatants | |||||||
| Commanders | |||||||
| Umar Avturkhanov Beslan Gantemirov |
Aslan Maskhadov Shamil Basayev |
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| First Chechen War |
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| 1st Grozny - Dolinskoye - Khankala - 2nd Grozny - Samashki - Budyonnovsk - Kizlyar-Pervomayskoye - Black Sea - Shatoy - 3rd Grozny |
November 1994 Battle of Grozny was a November 26 1994, failed attempt to seize the city of Grozny, the Chechen capital, and overthrow the separatist government of Dzhokhar Dudayev. The attack was staged by the forces of the anti-Dudayev opposition with the active support of Russian tanks and aircraft. This clandestine attempt at regime change ended with complete failure, prompting Moscow decided to carry out a large-scale military invasion of the republic next month.
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Background
In the summer of 1994 the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service (FSK) began active and open co-operation with the Chechen opposition leaders. Forces of Umar Avturkhanov (former officer of the Soviet MVD) and Beslan Gantemirov (former mayor of Grozny) not only received money from Moscow (a figure of 150 billion roubles was mentioned) but weapons as well. August and September 1994 saw the outbreak of fighting between the opposition and Dudayev's forces. By this time, the opposition had established a force of several hundred men, equipped with armoured vehicles and backed by Russian helicopters based in Mozdok airfield. This military campaign climaxed in mid-October 1994, when Gantamirov's forces tried to take Grozny by assault for the first time. Disappointed by their failures and aware of their military weakness up to and after the October assault, former Duma speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov intensified their lobbying with the FSK and Russian President Boris Yeltsin's staff in favour of more direct involvement on Moscow's part. As a result, Avturkhanov and Gantemirov, who by then had joined their military forces, received all the weapons, instructors, training and media support they requested, setting the ground for the final assault. Tank crewmen from Russia's elite formations were recruited for the task.
The battle
Shortly before the storm of Grozny, the Russian military intelligence (GRU) agents reported that Dudayev's army was completely incapable of offering serious resistance, in spite of the fact that three Russian tanks were destroyed even on their way to the city. On the morning of November 26, forces of the Chechen Provisional Council entered capital with the support of unmarked federal helicopters. According to the account by the Chechen fighter Dalkhan Kozayev[1], opposition forces numbered 42 tanks and 8 BTR-type wheeled APCs, and more than 3,000 men. Other estimates were up to 170 tanks and APCs and 5,000 men, while according to the opposition leaders just 1,200 fighters took active part in the attack. They were met with improvised but fierce defense of the government forces in the city, and soon the assault turned into a disaster. After nearly twelve hours of intense fighting, Dudayev's forces destroyed the opposition's armoured columns, capturing some 70[1] Russian soldiers and officers who had manned the crews of the tanks and the APCs. Some 37 to 67 armoured vehicles were reportedly destroyed or disabled, while four to five undamaged tanks were captured intact after the opposition fighters fled, leaving their Russians crews alone in the streets of Grozny. In addition, four helicopters and a Su-25 fighter-bomber manned by the Russian pilots were reportedly downed. All that remained of the Russian tank unit and the supporting formations of the Chechen opposition had left the city the same day.
Aftermath
This defeat was truly catastrophic, not only in military but in political terms. The employment of the Russian soldiers, secretly hired by the FSK, vindicated Dudayev's long-standing propaganda tune - namely, that there was no Chechen opposition, only "tools in Moscow's imperial game." Russian complicity was at first denied by Moscow, but then acknowledged when Dudayev's men paraded several captured Russian soldiers before TV cameras.[2] The November 26 defeat exhausted Russia's means of waging war against Dudayev by proxy means, leading to launching an all out and disastrous direct intervention next month, with Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev boasting that it would take a single airborne regiment only two hours to capture the city.[2]
See also
References
- ^ Russia's War in Chechnya: Victims Speak Out, Human Rights Watch, January 1995
- ^ Chechnya: 10 years of conflict, BBC News, 2 December, 2004
External links
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