(from Latin, voluntarius: willing, derived from volontas: choice, in turn derived from velle: to will) In biological psychology, the terms voluntary and INVOLUNTARY are applied to actions or processes that are either free and spontaneous (voluntary) or automatic and reflexive (involuntary). The voluntary MUSCLES are those striate muscles that can be controlled by an independent act of will or choice; the VOLUNTARY NERVOUS SYSTEM is an alternative term for the SOMATIC NERVOUS SYSTEM (which controls the striate muscles); and the INVOLUNTARY NERVOUS SYSTEM is an alternative term for the AUTONOMIC NERVOUS SYSTEM (which controls the internal organs in a manner that is thought to be largely automatic and without independent control).
However, use of these terms continues to generate debate. There are several broad questions that can be identified. (1) To what degree are actions dichotomized into voluntary and involuntary? The earliest theorists assumed that there was clear separation, but it is now thought that this is much less likely to be the case. For example, studies using BIOFEEDBACK have shown that it is possible to obtain a degree of voluntary control over such apparently involuntary processes as heart rate. (2) Are all voluntary actions genuinely ‘volun-tary’? It is not the case that all movement of the striate musculature involves voluntary control—many reflexes for example are not under voluntary control. Indeed, some authors have argued that all actions are composed of complex chains of innate reflexes and learnt actions (see for example MOTOR PROGRAMMING) that have become in a sense reflexive. As such, the very idea of a voluntary movement comes into doubt: if all movements have antecedent causes and can be decomposed into constituent parts, no account of independent volition (‘free will’) is required (see Prochazka et al., 2000) Such accounts are however, limited in their capacity to explain such things as the synthesis of new motor programmes in the face of novel tasks and environments, or the active suppression of behaviour which should be automatically selected. (3) Is there a distinction between voluntary and willed actions? The distinction between willed actions (actions being ‘purposeful, goal-directed behaviours, usually involving movement’—see Jahanshahi & Frith, 1998) and automatic actions was drawn by William James (1842–1910). James distinguished willed acts, requiring conscious control, from what he called IDEOMOTOR ACTIONS, which were automatic actions. Jahanshahi & Frith identify willed actions in three ways: by the involvement of attention and conscious awareness (see CONSCIOUSNESS); by choice and control; and by intentionality (see INTENTION). This is a much more interesting approach to the notion of ‘voluntary actions’, leading to consideration of a hierarchy of types of actions. At the highest levels are willed actions that require attention in order to be properly devised and executed. But willed actions can become automatic actions—that is, they can become learnt motor programmes. Handwriting is initially effortful and requires attention, but becomes automatic; driving a motor car similarly begins as a frightening and complex process needing one’s full attention, but in the course of time, this too can become automatic.
Below these are actions that are more or less reflexive: catching sight in peripheral vision of an approaching object will lead to an avoidance movement—ducking for example—that is automatic, not conscious. Such actions probably depend upon a degree of learning but are nevertheless classifiable as reflexes because of the simplicity of the neural connections between sensory input and motor output. Very basic reflexes—such as the monosynaptic STRETCH REFLEX—are the simplest form of these. Clearly, willed actions and automatic actions can be seen as forming part of a continuum from, at the one end, actions requiring a high degree of control by various psychological processes, though to actions that are automatic and require little or no cognitive processing.
The psychological processes involved in controlling willed actions are complex: Shallice’s SUPERVISORY ATTENTIONAL SYSTEM is such a mechanism. Others have used the term EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS to describe these processes. With regard to both of these processes, and now in respect of willed actions, there is some debate about the involvement of consciousness. The definition of willed action as involving attention, choice, control and intention could apply as well to a rodent as to a human. The involvement of consciousness however clouds this, since there is debate over the nature of consciousness in animals other than humans. While they are evidently conscious (they are awake and alert) are they necessarily self-aware in the same way as humans?
Clearly the terms voluntary and involuntary are the tips of conceptual icebergs. The term FOLK PSYCHOLOGY refers to those terms used in everyday language that describe our psychological states as we experience them (as opposed to the scientific terms with which we hope to dissect the machinery of our psychological states). Perhaps the best way to consider the terms voluntary and involuntary is to think of them as a type of ‘folk science’ term: terms without precise meaning but conveying broad ideas.
References
Jahanshahi M. & Frith C.D. (1998) Willed action and its impairments. Cognitive Neuropsychology 15:483–533.
Prochazka A., Clarac F., Loeb G.E., Rothwell J.C. & Wolpaw J.R. (2000) What do reflex and voluntary mean? Modern views on an ancient debate. Experimental Brain Research 130:417–432.
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