. Moral theories about what we ought to do are commonly, if not uncontroversially, divided into deontological and teleological ones (see ETHICS). The main, though not the only, teleological (or CONSEQUENTIALIST) theory is utilitarianism, which in its most general form is to the effect that we always ought to do what will produce the greatest good.
But ‘utilitarianism’ is sometimes restricted to hedonistic utilitarianism, which holds that the good is pleasure, or perhaps happiness. Early utilitarians seldom distinguished these. Ideal utilitarianism, notably represented by Moore, allows other things to be good, or even to be the main goods (for Moore personal relations and aesthetic experiences). Most early utilitarians were hedonistic, though contemporary ones are harder to classify, and often appeal to preference or satisfaction of desire rather than to pleasure. Utilitarianism has never held, as its name may suggest, that one should pursue only the useful and not the good in itself, nor that one should pursue only ‘low-grade’ pleasures; when Bentham said that if the pleasure is equal pushpin is as good as poetry, one should not ignore the ‘if’-clause.
Though the idea of utilitarianism goes back to the Greeks, its most famous exponents have been Bentham and J.S.Mill. Bentham’s greatest happiness principle says that one should pursue ‘the greatest good, or greatest happiness, of the greatest number’. The formula is imprecise, because if we try to spread happiness to many people we may produce less happiness overall than if we confine it to fewer people. Faced with this difficulty, utilitarians have usually said that one should aim for the greatest happiness overall, however distributed. It is therefore often objected that they cannot account for our intuitions about justice. It is also doubted whether they can account for our normal views on promise-keeping, truth-telling, etc. Also utilitarianism faces difficulties in connexion with such things as the double effect doctrine (see ETHICS) or the distinction between (e.g.) killing and letting die.
Utilitarianism may be attacked in a weak or a strong way. The weak way grants that we always ought to aim for the greatest happiness, but says we have other duties too, e.g. to distribute it in certain ways. The strong attack says that some of our duties not only go beyond utilitarianism, but are inconsistent with it, because they involve producing less happiness than other courses of action would produce.
Recently utilitarians have split into two camps. Act utilitarians (also called extreme or direct utilitarians; notably J.J.C.Smart) say that on each occasion we should do whatever act will produce the greatest good. Rule utilitarians (also called restricted or indirect utilitarians) say that we should obey those rules which would produce the greatest happiness if generally followed. These are other versions of rule utilitarianism. Suppose I ignore a red traffic light and, by some fluke, thereby prevent an accident which would otherwise have occurred. Then, whatever my motive, on act utilitarianism I did right, but on rule utilitarianism I did wrong, assuming that general obedience to the traffic laws produces better results than general disobedience to them.
Motive utilitarianism is the view that ‘one pattern of motivation is morally better than another to the extent that the former has more utility than the latter’ (Adams).
One difficulty for utilitarianism is how we can ever know what we ought to do. Not only can we never know the total consequences of any act, but much may depend on what others do, and they in turn must take account of what we may do (cf. DECISION THEORY, FREEWILL (on self-prediction)). Rule utilitarianism is partly intended to overcome this difficulty, but has difficulties of its own.
The question whether we should aim at what we think best or at what is really best raises a difficulty shared by other theories.
An interesting recent question concerns population policy. Normally utilitarians have concerned themselves with problems about creating goods and distributing them among a given population, but further questions obviously arise when we can decide how large that population shall be, and which of various alternative populations shall exist.
Negative utilitarianism says we should aim only to remove evil, not to produce good. Ordinary utilitarianism says we should both remove evil and produce good, aiming at the greatest overall balance of good.
H.B.Acton and J.W.N.Watkins, ‘Negative utilitarianism’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary vol., 1963.
R.M.Adams, ‘Motive utilitarianism’, Journal of Philosophy, 1976, reprinted P.Pettit (ed.), Consequentalism, Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1993. (For quotation see p. 470 (p. 74 in reprint).)
J.Annas, ‘Aristotle on pleasure and goodness’, in A.O.Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, California UP, 1980. (Uses Aristotle as basis for attacking some of the fundamental assumptions of utilitarianism. Cf. also in same volume J.McDowell, ‘The role of end in Aristotle’s ethics’, and the two articles by D.Wiggins, esp. pp. 258–61; all quite difficult and Wiggins uses some technicalities.)
G.E.M.Anscombe, ‘Modern moral philosophy’, Philosophy, 1958, reprinted in G.Wallace and A.D.M.Walker (eds), The Definition of Morality, Methuen, 1970, with additional bibliography, and in W.D.Hudson (ed.), The Is/Ought Question, Macmillan, 1969. (Criticizes utilitarianism.)
D.Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, Oxford UP, 1965. (Discusses relations between versions of act and rule utilitarianism. Discussed by B.A.Brody, ‘The equivalence of act and rule utilitarianism’, Philosophical Studies, 1967.)
*J.S.Mill, Utilitarianism, 1861. (Classic and provocative defence.)
J.Narveson, ‘Utilitarianism and new generations,’ Mind, 1967. (Population control. Discussed by T.L.S.Sprigge, ‘Professor Narveson’s utilitarianism’, Inquiry, 1968 (§2), and H.Vetter, ‘Utilitarianism and new generations’, Mind, 1971.)
D.Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford UP, 1984. (Part 1 discusses consequentialism in general. Part 4 discusses questions about population policy.)
A.Sen and B.A.O.Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge UP, 1982. (Mainly specially written essays, covering philosophy and economics.)
J.J.C.Smart, ‘Extreme and restricted utilitarianism’, in P.Foot (ed.), Theories of Ethics, Oxford, UP, 1967. (Act utilitarianism. See also J.Rawls, ‘Two concepts of rules’, ibid.)
*J.C.C. Smart and B.A.O.Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against, Cambridge, UP, 1973. (Debate with annotated bibliography).
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