A Dictionary of Philosophy, Third Edition
. When we speak there are many things we may be doing. We are normally saying something meaningful. We may be stating, ordering, promising, etc. And we may hope to achieve certain ends such as frightening someone. The systematic study of what we do in or by speaking dates mainly from J.L.AUSTIN, who distinguished three main levels of what he called ‘speech acts’: Locutionary acts, or locutions, are acts of uttering meaningful sentence. Illocutionary acts, or illocutions, are what we do in saying things, e.g. stating, promising. Perlocutionary acts, or perlocutions, are what we do by saying things, e.g. persuading, frightening. (The words ‘in’ and ‘by’ are only rough guides: Austin, chapter 10.) Austin thinks illocutions rely on conventions and can usually be made explicit with ‘hereby’: ‘I hereby warn (order) you….’ Perlocutions depend on natural or causal processes, etc.‘ we cannot say, ‘I hereby persuade you.’
These distinctions grew out of the breakdown, or apparent breakdown, of an earlier distinction between constatives, or utterances which state something, and so can be true or false, and performatives, or utterances which do something other than stating. To say ‘I promise’ is to promise, not to say that one is promising.
The related notions of performatives and illocutions have been used to try and explain the meaning of certain terms like GOOD, TRUE, PROBABLE, by reference to the ‘force’ of utterances containing them, i.e. what these utterances normally achieve (cf. NATURALISM).
To explain a term’s meaning in this way is to offer a speech act analysis of its meaning.
Of Austin’s three main terms ‘illocution’ is the most important, but whether meaning can ever be explained in terms of illocutionary force is disputed. Whether illocutionary force is something distinct from meaning, and whether there are locutions, as distinct from illocutions, have also been disputed. Other problems concern how successful a speech act must be to count as a speech act, and what the speaker must intend. Must the hearer hear and understand the speaker? Must the speaker intend the hearer to believe or understand something, and if so, what? (Cf. REFERRING.) The use of ‘act’ in this way has been objected to as a term of art which here rests on confusion (Cerf, § IV, in Fann).
J.L.Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Oxford UP, 1962.
K.T.Fann (ed.), Symposium on J.L.Austin, 1969, part 4. (Six relevant discussions.)
H.Fingarette, ‘Performatives’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 1967. J.D.B.Walker, ‘Statements and performatives’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 1969. (Both these defend Austin’s earlier constative/performative distinction.)
J.R.Searle (see bibliography to GOOD. Cf. also his ‘Austin on locutionary and illocutionary acts’, Philosophical Review, 1968, criticizing notion of locution.)
J.R.Searle (ed.), The Philosophy of Language, Oxford UP, 1971. (First four items are relevant).
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