. Either a kind of experience or a faculty, the latter including, in philosophy, the faculty of having ‘pure experiences’ (see PERCEPTION). Usually SENSE DATUM means an alleged object of experience distinct from the experiencing, while ‘sensation’ means the experience itself, but it is controversial how far there is a clearcut distinction here. We hear sounds, but ‘have’ auditory sensations. Is this because sounds can exist independently of being heard? When we ‘have’ or ‘feel’ a sensation, ‘sensation’ is perhaps an ‘internal accusative’, like ‘blow’ in ‘strike a blow’; whatever the case with sense data, sensations must presumably be had by some subjects. All this raises the question of what sensations are. Are they objects of some sort? Or properties of the subject which has them? Must the subject be conscious of them, or could (say) a pain exist without being present to consciousness, e.g. because the subject was distracted? Is pain representation of damage to the body? Also are sensations located? Is a pain in the leg really in the leg—even a ‘phantom’ pain felt when the leg has been amputated? And how do we know the location of a sensation, if it has one? Experiences seem to be called sensations primarily when either they have no external correlate, or they are of something rather general or obscure. Hearing a ringing in the ears is an auditory sensation. ‘Seeing stars’ and being dazzled, and perhaps being hallucinated, having after-images, and seeing a pure blue sky, are visual sensations, but we seldom talk of visual sensations of colour; cf. SEEING on the nature of colour.
‘Sensation of’ usually means ‘consisting of’ as in ‘sensation of pain, giddiness, nausea’, but it can mean ‘apparently, or as if, caused by’ as in ‘sensation of hardness, falling,’ ‘sensation of warmth’ may be of the ‘consisting of’ kind as in fever or of the ‘caused by’ kind as when extending a hand to fire. ‘Sensation’ can apparently refer to a kind of experience like ‘the sensation of falling’ or to something datable such as ‘the sensation I had just now’, but phrases like ‘I keep feeling that sensation’ suggest that the ‘datable’ cases should really be analysed as ‘kind’ cases where ‘had’ means ‘had an instance of’. This affects the question whether several people can have the same sensation. (For a related important problem concerning sensations see PRIVATE LANGUAGE.)
Most sensations seem to be bodily, but some, like the sensation of being followed, are hard to classify. See also PERCEPTION, FEELINGS, SEEING.
D.W.Hamlyn, The Theory of Knowledge, Macmillan, 1970. (Chapter 6 has general discussion of sensation, sense data and perception.)
F.Jackson, ‘The existence of mental objects,’ in J.Dancy (ed.), Perceptual Knowledge, Oxford UP, 1988. (Defends it.)
C.Peacocke, Sense and Content, Oxford UP, 1993, chapter 1.
G.Ryle, ‘Sensations,’ in H.D.Lewis (ed.), Contemporary British Philosophy, 3rd series, 1956, reprinted in R.J.Swartz (ed.), Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing, Doubleday, 1965. (One view of ambiguity of ‘sensation’ and role of sensations.)
*P.Smith and O.R.Jones, The Philosophy of Mind: an Introduction, Cambridge UP, 1986. (Chapters 14 and 15 defend functionalist account of pain.)
G.N.A.Vesey, ‘Berkeley and sensations of heat’, Philosophical Review 1960. (Why we can call both objects and sensations hot.)
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