The 1951 United Nations (UN) Convention on the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as a person who has a well founded fear of persecution by reason of one of five grounds (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group) and whose country of nationality or former habitual residence is unable or unwilling to provide protection. Some 23 million refugees are distinguished from other kinds of *migrants—even those fleeing natural disasters or environmental destruction—by their right to claim international protection. The elements of international protection are ‘admission to safety, exemption from forcible return, nondiscrimination, and assistance for survival’ (UNHCR 1993:5). Refugees are often the kin of persons who are internally displaced (of whom there are now 24 million), but they have fled to other parts of their countries rather than cross borders.
The right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution is recognised in article 14 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet states have no obligation to grant asylum, particularly when they are not party to at least one of the international instruments for setting out the rights and obligations of states to refugees. Persons who have committed serious non-political crimes, war crimes, or engaged in acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN are excluded from benefiting from the Convention.
In 1969, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted a broader definition to encompass massive refugee flows in Africa where the harm feared also resulted from external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order. In 1984, the ten Latin American states enacted the Cartagena Declaration, adopting a similar definition to that set out by OAU and including fear of generalised violence and massive violations of human rights as enumerated grounds for regional protection (Hathaway 1991:16–21). Enlightened interpretation of the UN definition, even in the age of increasingly restrictive access to asylum procedures, can go some way towards protecting persons fleeing civil war, provided it can be demonstrated that a person faced heightened risk of serious harm because of civil or political status. However, refugee status is often not given to victims of civil war, but some states provide for interim status to remain until it is safe to return.
There are disruptions to virtually every phase of a refugee’s life. Marginality characterises the phases of the refugee experience: anticipated harm, flight, search for asylum, resettlement or repatriation. Few who become refugees can anticipate the experience that envelops them. There is an oppressive time component: generations can be born into refugeehood. There is also a gender component: women and children comprise 80 per cent of the world’s refugees and often experience persecution differently from men. The irony is that while international protection is meant to protect persons who have become disenfranchised from their own states, these same persons may remain marginalised throughout refugeehood.
The anthropological study of refugees is noted for in situ fieldwork: in camps, in cities, in asylum seeking-procedures, or in repatriation movements back home. It is concerned with questions of meaning, perception, and survival as viewed by the refugees themselves and by the assisting agencies (Gilad 1990; Maalki 1995). The anthropologist may be led to criticism of the agencies and hence to applied research for the improvement of the lot of refugees (Harrell-Bond 1986). Finally, the anthropological study of refugees requires more than lip service to interdisciplinary understanding of law, international relations, psychology and *sociology.
LISA GILAD
Lisa Gilad was a Member of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB). The views in this entry were those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IRB.
