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TH. VAN DEN END
INDUSTRIALIZATION
The Industrial Revolution began in ENGLAND around 1780 with the mechanization of cotton spinning in Lancashire. From there, mechanization spread to other parts of the British textile industry, then to other British industries, then to other parts of the world—with immense economic, social, political, and religious consequences. In the 1830s Belgium and some regions of France WERE experiencing their own Industrial Revolution. GERMANY and the UNITED STATES followed soon after, and by the late nineteenth century southern and eastern Europe and Scandinavia were also industrializing. Since World War II there has been.major industrial growth in Asia and LATIN AMERICA, whereas in Europe and North America the period since the 1970s has seen the decline of manufacturing and a large rise of employment in service-related enterprises.
The patterns of change in nineteenth-century Britain have been repeated in numerous countries since. There was a big shift of population from the countryside to cities and industrial regions, leading eventually to rural depopulation, and a sharp drop in the numbers working on the land. Landed wealth declined, whereas industrial and commercial wealth brought political as well as economic power. Cities like Manchester, Birmingham, and Glasgow grew rapidly under the leadership of a new aristocracy of factory owners and merchants. These cities were socially segregated, and in the crowded and often unhealthy factory districts there was a concentrated working-class population, with its own organizations, including trade unions and political parties. Industrialization also tended to mean increasing religious pluralism. In the nineteenth century Catholic and Jewish immigrants flooded into Protestant cities like London, New York, or Berlin. Since World War II Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs, as well as Christians of many unfamiliar kinds, responded to the demand for cheap labor, or sometimes the business opportunities, in industrialized Europe and North America. Classical sociology claimed that this great mixing of populations bred a sophisticated relativism. If this has happened, it has been a very long term process. At least in the short run, the mixing of populations of different backgrounds has more often strengthened ethnic and religious identities (see ETHNICITY). In nineteenth-century cities, Catholics and Protestants, Christians, and Jews, were frequently in conflict, sometimes violent. In the later twentieth century the large migration to European cities of Muslims from Turkey, North Africa, and south Asia led to similar tensions, although hostility to Islam was often justified in secularist or racist, rather than Christian, terms.
In the long term, industrialization revolutionized standards of living, lifestyles, and often mentalities. Britain again offers a model of how this happened. Whereas the first generation of industrial entrepreneurs were often devout and relatively austere, their children and grandchildren wanted to live the lives of gentlemen. The later nineteenth century saw many large employers moving out of the cities to country estates and a life increasingly dominated by leisure. Those who had been brought up as Dissenters (see DISSENT) were moving to the CHURCH OF ENGLAND or sometimes to agnosticism. For the mass of the people the benefits of industrial wealth and the possibilities of increasing leisure came more slowly. Not until the later nineteenth century were the better-off sections of the working class beginning to enjoy cycling, going to professional soccer and cricket matches and music halls, and making day trips to the seaside. In the 1920s and 1930s cinema and radio surpassed all older forms of leisure, although only in the 1950s and 1960s did former luxuries, such as televisions, cars, and foreign holidays become a possibility for the mass of the population. A new age of affluence had dawned, and with growing leisure opportunities a mental revolution was completed that had been developing slowly over several decades. One symbol of this revolution was the demise of the set-apart Sunday, which had been gradually eroded since the 1890s, but which survived into the 1960s before collapsing in the face of growing demands for leisure. Partly at stake was individual freedom and the repudiation of any attempt to regulate the moral standards of the community. Partly it was about the rejection of all forms of puritanism and the embrace of hedonistic values. In the relatively impoverished society of the later nineteenth century, churches offering low-cost facilities were major players in the field of leisure; by the later twentieth century commercial interests predominated.
Religion, like every other area of life, felt the effects of these dramatic changes, and in some countries Protestants played a prominent part in helping to bring them about. The following discussion looks at ways in which Protestants may have contributed to the Industrial Revolution, some of its consequences for them, and some of their responses to its consequences.
In looking at the contribution of Protestantism to industrialization, one must inevitably start with the “Weber Thesis.” Max Weber’s famous essay, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, first published in 1904–1905, was prompted by figures showing that in southern Germany, where the majority of the population were Catholics, Protestants were more likely than Catholics to be successful in business. He cited evidence that this was also true in other countries, and that these Protestant businessmen were especially numerous in the Calvinist churches and in various smaller denominations, such as METHODISM and The SOCIETY OF FRIENDS (Quakers). He traced this back partly to the Protestant concept of “calling,” according to which every “secular” occupation is a vocation, through which one can serve God; partly to the disciplined lifestyle promoted by these religious groups. He linked the latter to their anxiety as to whether they were saved, and the consequent drive to live in a consistent way that would show that the GRACE of God was working through them. The combined effect of these factors was a tendency to sanctify work. This contributed to the early stages of capitalist development both because of the importance of capital accumulation and because of the need to break with “traditional” working habits. Later, when capitalist industry had become well established, religious motivation was no longer necessary, although inherited wealth usually was, so the majority of successful businessmen were descendants of the successful businessmen of earlier generations, whose religion did contribute to their success. The Weber Thesis has been endlessly debated, and there is still no consensus. It seems that he is right in identifying a connection between Protestantism, especially in its sectarian forms, and early industrial entrepreneurship, but that he failed to find a fully convincing explanation. In predominantly Catholic states such as France or Bavaria, Protestants were heavily overrepresented among early industrialists. In mainly Protestant coun tries, such as England, some Nonconformist denominations, such as the Quakers, were also overrepresented (see NONCONFORMITY). Many other religious and ethnic minorities have distinguished themselves in business. However, some specific aspects of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Protestantism, especially in sectarian forms, may also be relevant, including high levels of literacy, skills acquired through lay office in the congregation, the ascetic lifestyle mentioned by Weber, and the role of nationwide sectarian networks. There is less evidence that Protestantism contributed directly to industrialization in Latin America or KOREA. The massive growth of PENTECOSTALISM since the 1950s has taken place mainly toward the lower end of the social hierarchy among such groups as small farmers, artisans, and service workers. Protestants have tended to improve their situation in a modest way, but most of them have started so low in the occupational hierarchy that major entrepreneurial success has seldom been possible.
The qualities and skills that favored success in business could also equip sectarian Protestants for leading roles in labor organization. In Britain the period from the 1840s to the 1920s saw a strong sectarian, especially Methodist presence in the trade unions, and when the modern Labour Party emerged in the early twentieth century, it was said to “owe more to Methodism than to Marx.” This claim has been almost as hotly debated as the Weber Thesis. However oversimplified it may be, though, it contains an important truth, that Dissenting Protestants of all kinds were heavily overrepresented among the early leaders of the modern British working-class movement. This was especially true of the miners, for long the largest occupational group in Britain, and it is appropriate that the most revered figure in British labor history, Keir Hardie, was both a miner and a member of a small Scottish Dissenting sect, the Evangelical Union. Protestants were also prominent in the American labor movement in the nineteenth century. The popular critique of capitalism drew heavily on the BIBLE, and especially the Prophets.
Early industrialization disrupted existing patterns of life, sometimes with devastating consequences. Migrants to new industrial districts were attracted by the hope of higher wages, but they could also face the loss of family support, harsh factory discipline, and frequent periods of unemployment. They might find it difficult to maintain traditional religious observances, whether because of Sunday work or because of a lack of churches and priests. Established churches, whether Catholic or Protestant, were usually slow to adapt to the rapid movements of population, and many of them never entirely recovered from the losses suffered during early industrialization. Sectarian churches, with their flexible organization, often adapted more readily. In many parts of northern England the Methodists took the place of the Church of England as the main form of organized religion in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Lay preachers could take the place of ordained ministers, and small unpretentious chapels, or even private houses, could be used for worship. Baptist, Congregational, and Calvinistic Methodist chapels sprang up all along the mining and iron-working valleys of South Wales. In SWEDEN, too, free churches flourished in new industrial settlements, whereas Lutheran congregations dwindled. Something similar happened when Latin American countries, such as BRAZIL and Chile, began to industrialize in the twentieth century. In mining and factory districts many workers turned away from the Catholic Church, which seemed too much linked with TRADITION and old social hierarchies. For some of them Socialism or COMMUNISM became a secular faith, although others found their SALVATION in pentecostalism. Since the 1960s one of the areas of fastest economic growth in the world has been East Asia. Here too, most notably in South Korea, rapid social change and the consequent weakening of traditional social structures and religious patterns have been conducive to the growth of Protestantism. By 1980 it was estimated that 20 percent of the South Korean population were Protestants, including not only members of the longestablished Presbyterian (see PRESBYTERIANISM) and Methodist churches, but also the newer pentecostals.
By no means did all Protestants welcome the growth of mechanized industry. In Europe the CLERGY of the established churches were often rooted in the countryside and accustomed to a regime of rural paternalism. They were especially critical of Sunday labor, although they often presented a more generalized critique of the relentless pursuit of profit and the neglect of the workforce by early factory owners. Political or religious differences might play a role here. For instance, Conservative clergy were especially alert to the failings of Liberal factory owners. However, these early doubts often changed to more favorable evaluations—both in Europe, and especially in the United States. In the “Gilded Age,” after the Union victory in the CIVIL WAR, many American preachers presented industrialists in a heroic light. Business success was seen as the logical consequence of faith in God and the practice of Protestant virtues. The famous Brooklyn preacher HENRY WARD BEECHER contrasted Europe and its hereditary elites and massive social inequalities with the free American Republic, and declared that “The general truth will stand that no man in this land suffers from poverty unless it be more than his fault—unless it be his sin.”
In the early and mid-Victorian years similar ideas were also common in Britain. The years around 1850 saw the emergence of a new breed of industrial paternalists—men who had survived the stormy years of the early 1840s when many of their rivals had suffered shipwreck, and who now felt secure enough to offer a capitalism with a human face. Many of them had close connections with a church, whether Anglican or Dissenting. Some of their wealth was poured into building churches and paying the minister’s salary, and the ministers were naturally grateful. The paternalism of these years tended to be two-edged: the churches, schools, houses with gardens, and sports fields went hand in hand with firm discipline and sometimes with the absence of what were seen as less desirable facilities such as pubs. Both in Britain and in the United States successful businessmen rose to positions of prominence within many Protestant denominations. Their business skills were valued, and their gifts of money were essential for the success of many denominational projects. A typical figure was Sir Robert Perks, the railway magnate and Liberal MP, who was one of the most powerful figures in British Methodism at the start of the twentieth century.
By this time, the influence of the “Christian businessman” was beginning to decline, as family firms were being absorbed into large corporations, run by professional managers. In the twentieth century the lay leaders of the British churches were increasingly drawn from the professions, rather than business. Meanwhile, many Protestant preachers had become less sure of the benefits of industrial capitalism. The Christian Socialists, with their schemes for worker cooperatives, appeared in England as early as 1848, although the movement was short-lived (see SOCIALISM, CHRISTIAN). By the 1880s and 1890s unease was much more widespread. Christian Socialism had revived in Britain. The SOCIAL GOSPEL had emerged in the United States. In Germany, the Evangelical Social Congress, founded in 1890, acted as a focal point for a diverse band of Protestant critics of the existing social order, ranging from the Liberal Max Weber to the Social Democrat Paul Göhre to the anti-Semite Adolf Stoecker (see ANTI-SEMITISM). What all had in common was a recognition of the dangers inherent in the unfettered power of many great industrialists and of the need for the state to take a more active role in improving working-class living and working conditions.
These debates continue to the present day. In 1983 the main churches in AUSTRALIA published a report, Changing Australia, that criticized current trends toward privatization and deregulation, and that, although less specific about the alternatives, favored a more socialist approach. The Church of England’s famous report of 1985, Faith in the City, focusing especially on the needs of impoverished “Urban Priority Areas,” reached similar conclusions and provoked a furious counterattack by ministers of the free-market Thatcher government, who accused it of “Marxism.” Meanwhile the “Prosperity Gospel” preached by many of the pentecostal churches both in the United States and in AFRICA returned to the mid-Victorian view according to which poverty is a SIN and the successful businessman is to be regarded as a model Christian. Indeed, according to this Gospel, economic success is the inevitable result of faithful adherence to biblical principles.
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