A Dictionary of Philosophy, Third Edition
. A general faculty, common to all or nearly all humans and sometimes regarded, either seriously or by poetic licence, as a sort of impersonal external power (‘the dictates (truths) of reason’). This faculty has seemed to be of two sorts, a faculty of intuition by which one ‘sees’ truths or abstract things (‘essences’ or universals, etc.), and a faculty of reasoning, i.e. passing from premises to a conclusion (discursive reason). The verb ‘reason’ is confined to this latter sense, which is now anyway the commonest for the noun too, though the two senses are related (to pass from premises to conclusion is to intuit a connexion between them).
Kant contrasts reason, which is concerned with mediate INFERENCES, and understanding and power of judgment, which are concerned with acquiring concepts and passing judgments, respectively.
Practical reason has been distinguished from theoretical or speculative reason since Aristotle, and raises problems: Is reason in the practical sphere ‘the slave of the passions’ (Hume), i.e. is it limited to showing us means to ends which the passions dictate?
How far can reason be distinguished from feeling, emotion, etc.? (This problem parallels that of relating theoretical reason to the senses: cf. PERCEPTION.) Can reason mediate between morals and self-interest (‘A sacrifice beyond all reason’)? Also how many kinds of reasoning are there apart from deductive reasoning? (Cf. LOGIC.)
A second group of uses of ‘reason’ allows the plural and involves expressions like ‘a (the, his) reason’. A reason may be a cause as in ‘the reason for the explosion’, or a factor in an explanation as in ‘the reason why there are infinitely many prime numbers’, and again problems arise over the practical sphere: how are reasons for believing related to reasons for acting? Only the former are evidence, but Smith’s honesty may be a reason for believing him, and also for rewarding him.
Can the reason why someone acts be a cause of his acting? This depends on whether actions can be caused but it is a further question whether his reason can be the cause. ‘The’ reason might be something he is unconscious of, which ‘his’ reason cannot be (cf. FREEWILL).
‘He has a reason to act’ may mean that acting would promote some purpose he has, or some interest he has, or some purpose he should morally have. An interest is perhaps a purpose he would or should rationally have if he knew certain facts. One can have a reason, even consciously, and act as it prescribes, without acting from it. Also the reason why Smith acted, whether or not it coincides with his reason, need not be a reason for acting, not even a poor reason. See also INCONTINENCE.
Aristotle, De Anima (On the Soul), (III, 4–8 (theoretical reason), III, 9–10; Nicomachean Ethics, VII, 1–10; De Motu (Movement of Animals), 701a, 7–25 (all these treat practical reason). (Classic though difficult discussions.)
H.I.Brown, Rationality, Routledge, 1988. (Criticizes view that rationality consists in evaluating evidence by rules. Also criticizes FOUNDATIONALISM and social relativism.)
R.Edgley, Reason in Theory and Practice, Hutchinson, 1969. (Defends practical reason, discussing its relations with theoretical.)
D.Gauthier, ‘Reason and maximization,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1975. (How is maximizing utility related to rationality?)
D.Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 1739–40, book 2, part 3, § 3. (Reason as slave of passions; see p. 415 of edition by L.A. Selby-Bigge (Clarendon, 1888), and see also the indexes of this and Selby-Bigge’s edition of Hume’s Enquiries (Clarendon, 2nd edn, 1902) under ‘reason’ and ‘reasoning’ for Hume’s general treatment of reason both theoretical and practical.)
I.Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1781, 1787. (See ‘reason’, ‘understanding’, ‘judgment’ in index to N.Kemp Smith’s translation, 1929.)
J.Kemp, Reason, Action and Morality, RKP, 1964. (The place of reason in morals and conduct. Includes historical material.)
J.Raz (ed.), Practical Reasoning, Oxford UP, 1978. (Readings.)
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