A Dictionary of Philosophy, Third Edition
. Loosely, a term’s indeterminacy of meaning. Waismann thought that with most empirical predicates (see A PRIORI) we cannot guarantee to be able to apply or refuse to apply them in all cases. However precise we made their meaning a borderline case could always turn up in the future. He called this feature open texture, and distinguished it from VAGUENESS, which is a feature of already existing uses of predicates, not of possible future uses (see AMBIGUITY). Vagueness can be minimized by giving more accurate rules, but open texture cannot because we cannot predict future borderline cases.
He compared open texture to possibility of vagueness. Open texture and vagueness are important in connexion with verifiability (see POSITIVISM) and the law of EXCLUDED MIDDLE. It is not clear that they are, as often thought, confined to empirical predicates.
F.Waismann, ‘Verifiability’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary vol., 1945, reprinted in his How I see Philosophy, Macmillan, 1968, and in G.H.R.Parkinson (ed.), The Theory of Meaning, Oxford UP, 1968. (Open texture and verifiability.)
L.J.Cohen, The Diversity of Meaning, Methuen, 1962, chapter 9. (Significance of vagueness.)
I.Lakatos (see bibliography to MATHEMATICS). (Open texture of mathematical concepts.)
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