Liberty (or freedom) is often divided by political theorists into two types, for analytic clarity. Negative liberty refers essentially to ‘absence of external constraints’ (see state of nature). Thus, as long as there is no law or social practice preventing me from doing something, or forcing me into some course of action, I can be seen as free in that respect. This is the idea of liberty most commonly found in modern Western democratic societies and in classical liberalism. The emphasis is on what other people might do to stop me carrying out my will. But what I choose to do is taken as outside the bounds of the concept. If I choose to be a drug addict, I am either free or not depending on what society does to stop me buying my preferred drugs. Often, though not invariably, this will be linked to the idea that the political system is only entitled to infringe on someone’s freedom when it is preventing actions that would hurt another person, and that what an individual does to themself is their own business. This concept of liberty is the basic one found in English social thought from Hobbes and Locke through utilitarianism and onwards.
The more continental European tradition of liberty, often referred to as positive liberty, has its roots originally in classical Greek thought, and later, in European Idealist philosophy like that of Hegel or Kant.
More recently it has been found particularly in some Marxist thinkers, especially those like Marcuse. The stress here is on actual internal freedom of choice, rather than, as in the English liberal tradition, external constraints on putting a choice into action. Basically the argument rests on the idea that the essential human nature will produce rational and good choices. But this inner human nature can be warped by social forces and ideological manipulation so that the individual does not realize what they truly want, and makes false choices. Ultimately it goes back to the Platonic doctrine that no one can ever freely choose what is wrong, and that evil is a fault in understanding, not a weakness of will. In the hands of later theorists it becomes the doctrine that society, especially capitalist society, alienates people from their true nature, and produces apparent needs and desires which are convenient for the rulers of that sort of society. Sometimes the doctrine has obvious sense: those addicted to dangerous drugs can, perhaps, be said to be unfree in pursuing their desires. But often the theory depends on a specially privileged position by which those who are ideologically sound are allowed to stipulate what other people would really want if only they realized it existed. Thus the argument is used, for example, to question election results in modern democracies, on the grounds that the working class would actually vote for socialist parties if they had not been ‘tampered’ with by the media, and are suffering a lack of ‘positive’ freedom in voting because of their deluded notions.
Neither positive nor negative liberty concepts are as simple as these accounts, and it is unlikely that any single political thinker will hold entirely to any one. But the distinction is an important one, identifying as it does a long-term conflict within Anglo-European social thought, and relating to real arguments in modern political positions.
This is the complete article, containing 554 words
(approx. 2 pages at 300 words per page).
