A Dictionary of Philosophy, Third Edition
. Generally a direct relation between the mind and some object, analogous to what common sense thinks is the relation between us and something we see unambiguously in a clear light.
Bergson contrasts intuition as a means of knowing reality as it is in itself with intellect as a means by which we manipulate reality for purposes of action.
What we are said to intuit may be objects not accessible to the senses (numbers, universals, God, etc.), or truths, and intuitions have been divided into ‘intuitions of in the former case and ‘intuitions that’ in the latter. The emphasis is on the directness of the relation, free from any influence of the environment or interpretation. Hence Kant used ‘intuition’ for our relation to sensible objects too, so far as this was considered as abstracted from anything contributed by the mind. Intuition thus considered has something in common with Russell’s ‘acquaintance’ (cf. EPISTEMOLOGY). Locke claimed that we have intuitive knowledge of our own existence, Husserl that we have it of essences, and Spinoza that we have it of elementary mathematics.
Intuition of truths may take the form of knowledge which we cannot account for, simply because we are unconscious of the reasons which led us to it. In the case of such ‘hunches’ investigation will often uncover the reasons. More philosophically important are cases where, allegedly, there are no reasons to be uncovered, and no means of checking the truth of apparent intuitions, except perhaps by their coherence with further intuitions.
Intuitions of this kind have been important especially in philosophy of mathematics (see INTUITIONISM) and ethics, and also in logic and metaphysics. Whether such intuitions can be accepted, and whether ultimately they are unavoidable, are disputed questions. Cf. also RATIONALISM.
In ethics especially, and concerning topics like personal IDENTITY, philosophers often appeal also to the ‘pre-reflective’ intuitions of common sense to act as a check on the acceptability of the conclusions they come to on theoretical grounds.
H.L.Bergson, ‘Introduction to metaphysics’, 1903 (translated 1912 and in his The Creative Mind, Philosophical Library, New York, 1946), Creative Evolution, 1907 (trans., Macmillan 1911).
D.Føllesdal, D.Bell, ‘Objects and concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary vol., 1994. (Includes discussion of Husserl on intuitions.)
H.L.A.Hart, G.E.Hughes, J.N.Findlay, ‘Is there knowledge by acquaintance?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary vol., 1949.
W.Hudson, Ethical Intuitonism, Macmillan, 1967. (Brief introduction.)
J.Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, 1690, book 4, chapter 9. (Intuition of the self.)
D.Pole, Conditions of Rational Inquiry, Athlone, 1961, chapter 1. (General discussion of intuition.)
H.Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, Macmillan, 1874, (7th edn and final version, 1907), esp. book 1, chapter 8. (Types of ethical intuitionism.)
B.Spinoza, Ethics, book 2, § 40 n. 2, Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding, §§ 19, 22–4. (‘Scientia intuitiva’ introduced.)
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