Routledge Dictionary of Language and Linguistics
intension [Lat. intensio ‘a state of tension’]
The intension of a concept (or of a set) is defined by indicating the properties or traits that characterize it; the intension corresponds to its content in contrast with its extension, which is defined by counting all the elements that fall under the concept. Two predicates are intensionally identical if they mean the same thing in regard to their content, i.e. if they have the same semantic features when subjected to componential analysis; e.g. car/auto; X is the mother of Y/Y is the child of X. They are extensionally identical if they refer to the same class of countable elements as, for example, evening star/morning star; both expressions refer to Venus, their intensional meaning, however, is different (
connotation). The dichotomy of intensional vs extensional semantic analysis goes back to G.Frege’s distinction between ‘sense’ and ‘meaning.’ It is the same basic distinction between extensional interpretations in referential semantics and intensional theories of meaning (cf. logical semantics), as they pertain to categorial grammar or Montague grammar, for example; there is, however, no agreement about the interpretation of intension or ‘sense.’
References
Carnap, R. 1947. Meaning and necessity. Chicago, IL.
——1947. Meaning and synonymy in natural languages. PhS 6. 33–47.
Cresswell, M.J.
1973. Logics and languages. London.
Frege, G. 1892. Über Sinn und Bedeutung. ZPhK (new series) 100. 25–50. (Repr. in Kleine Schriften, ed. I.Angelelli. Darmstadt, 1967. 143–62.)
Lewis, D. 1970. General semantics. Synthese 22. 18–67.
categorial grammar, formal logic, intensional logic, Montague grammar
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