In politics elections are a device whereby popular preferences are aggregated to choose an officeholder. Choice by elections is now almost inseparable from representative democracy. Some see the opportunity for choice at periodic elections as the key element of western democracy (Lipset 1960; Schumpeter 1942). In 1975, thirty-three states did not hold elections to choose political leaders. For other states the crucial question is: what sort of elections? A further thirty-three states allowed only one candidate for each office. These are ‘consent’ elections (Mackenzie 1958). States which allow competitive elections and the possibility of replacing the government are largely western.
Election systems provide guidelines on such matters as who votes and how, frequency of election, how votes are counted, who stands for office and so on. In the twentieth century, most states have granted the vote to all (with a few exceptions) adult resident citizens. Over time, the suffrage has been extended from estates to individuals, and in the twentieth century to large categories formerly excluded on grounds of race, sex and property qualifications. The change has also been to equality or ‘one man one vote one value’ (Rokkan 1970).
In most states, responsibility for registering eligible voters lies with the government. A significant exception is the USA, where states leave registration to individuals. This partly explains why the turn-out in presidential elections since 1960 has averaged 60 per cent, compared to over 80 per cent in many western states. But US voters have more opportunities to cast votes, in federal, state, local and primary elections, and in long ballots. At the other extreme, political and cultural pressures may produce remarkable turn-outs and verdicts, for example 99.9 per cent turn-out in the former German Democratic Republic in 1964.
Elections have several functions (Rose and Mossawir 1967). These include designating, directly or indirectly, the government; providing feedback between voters and government; demonstrating public support for or repudiation of a regime: providing a means for the recruitment of political leaders; and making the government answerable to the electorate. Functions may differ in states which have elections without choice, where a party’s hegemonic or monopolistic position makes the outcome a foregone conclusion (Hermet et al. 1978).
In some countries (Belgium, Italy, Denmark and The Netherlands, for example) it is not the election but the inter-party bargaining following the election which determines the composition of government. Where the party system provides a choice between alternative potential majorities, voters do have such a choice. The impact of elections on policies depends in part on a programmatic disciplined majority party being in government. Until recently, the British two-party system was admired for providing a model of ‘responsible party government’. More direct popular verdicts on issues may be made through referendums.
The nature of the electoral choice in each state is shaped by three sets of factors. First, the object of election, which may be to choose a constituency representative, party list or president. Second, the party system, or pattern of voting alignments (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), which in turn is shaped by cleavages in society, the electoral system, and the manoeuvres of elites. Third, the electoral system, particularly those provisions which aggregate votes and translate them into seats, that is, rules for counting and weighing votes.
A distinction may be drawn between the absolute majoritarian system, as in France, in which the winner has to achieve at least half the votes; the plurality (first past the post) system in many English-speaking countries; the various forms of proportionalism, including the pure proportional representation (PR) in The Netherlands (where 0.67 per cent of the vote gives a group a seat in the legislature); and those that combine elements of different systems (for example, Germany has PR for half the seats, subject to a party gaining at least 5 per cent of the vote).
Proportionalism was introduced at the turn of the century in divided societies to provide guarantees to minorities which felt threatened by universal suffrage or majority rule. Proportionalism furthers the goals of representativeness but, in the absence of a clear party majority, makes the choice of government less certain.
The British plurality system has usually achieved certainty in choice of the government while sacrificing representativeness. In October 1974 Labour had 51 per cent of the seats in the House of Commons with 39 per cent of the votes. The two systems maximize different values; most western states have opted for proportionalism, subject to qualifications.
We lack a good typology of elections. One may distinguish between degrees of choice, which in turn depends on the number of effective parties and the prospects of turnover in government. The USA has two parties, The Netherlands and Denmark a dozen. Italy, Sweden and Norway have had very long spells of dominant one-party rule, and there has been only one change in France since 1958. In the USA Key (1955) distinguished between elections which were maintaining (reflecting normal party loyalties), deviating (in which short-term factors produced a short-term surge or decline in support for the parties) and realigning (in which there is a long-term change in the balance of party strengths).
There are limits on the decisiveness of elections as authoritative arbiters of policy. Incumbents of the bureaucracy and judiciary, and leaders of powerful interests, who are not elected by the voters, constitute checks. At present ‘votes count, resources decide’ (Rokkan 1966). The debate about the relative influence of socioeconomic factors or party political factors (and therefore elections) has not been conclusive. The influence of the government depends on the power centralization in society. In pluralist and market societies the government is only one decision maker among others, and competitive elections and majority rule are only two elements in representative democracy. Competitive elections do not ensure the political responsiveness of an elite; they have to operate in favourable conditions. There are alternative methods of facilitating popular choice and eliciting and demonstrating popular consent (for example, acclamation, seniority, rotation, and elite bargaining), but election is still the birthmark of a government claiming to be democratic.
Dennis Kavanagh
University of Nottingham
References
Hermet, G. et al. (1978) Elections Without Choice, Paris.
Key, V.O. Jr (1955) ‘A theory of critical elections’, Journal of Politics.
Lipset, S. (1960) Political Man, London.
Lipset, S. and Rokkan, S. (eds) (1967) Party Systems and Voter Alignments, New York.
Mackenzie, W.J.M. (1958) Free Elections, London.
Rokkan, S. (1966) ‘Norway: numerical democracy and corporate pluralism’, in R.Dahl (ed.) Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, New Haven, CT.
——(1970) Citizens, Elections, Parties, New York.
Rose, R. and Mossawir, H. (1967) ‘Voting and elections: a functional analysis’, Political Studies.
Schumpeter, J.A. (1942) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York.
