Six distinctions must be drawn in any account of the concept of authority (Friedman 1973; Lukes 1978; Raz 1989).
First, the failure to explain the unity and order of social life and the compliance of subjects solely in terms of coercion and/or rational agreement opens a space for the concept of authority. Authority refers to a distinctive form of compliance in social life. Three accounts exist of the basis of this special compliance. One sees authoritative institutions as reflecting the common beliefs, values, traditions and practices of members of society (Arendt 1963; Parsons 1960); a second sees political authority as offering a co-ordination solution to a Hobbesian state of nature, or a lack of shared values (Hobbes 1651); a third view argues that although social order is imposed by force, it derives its permanence and stability through techniques of legitimation, ideology, hegemony, mobilization of bias, false consensus and so on, which secure the willing compliance of citizens through the manipulation of their beliefs (Lukes 1978; Weber 1978 [1922]).
Second, what is special about the compliance that B renders A which marks off authority from coercion and rational agreement? Coercion secures B’s compliance by the use of force or threats; persuasion convinces B by appeal to arguments that an action is in B’s interests, is, for example, morally right, or prudent; but B complies with authority when B recognizes A’s right to command B in a certain sphere. B voluntarily surrenders the right to make compliance contingent on an evaluation of the content of A’s command, and obeys because A’s order comes from an appropriate person and falls within the appropriate range. Where authority exists there will be ‘rules of recognition’ (Hart 1961) or ‘marks’ by which to identify those eligible to exercise it.
Third, we must also distinguish between de facto and de jure authority (Peters 1967; Winch 1967). De facto authority is evidenced whenever B complies with A in the appropriate manner; de jure authority exists where A has a right to B’s compliance in a given area which derives from a set of institutional rules. That A has one form of authority in no way entails that A will also have the other.
Fourth, many writers have referred to authority as ‘legitimate power’. This may mean either that coercion is exercised by someone with de jure authority, although the coerced agent is not responding to A’s authority; or that A’s orders in fact produce this distinctive form of non-coerced deferential obedience (A thus has de facto authority)—this being in sharp contrast to cases where compliance is based on fear.
Fifth, authority is thus a two-tier concept: it refers to a mode of influence and compliance, and to a set of criteria which identify who is to exercise this influence. For this influence to take effect it must be exercised ‘within a certain kind of normative arrangement accepted by both parties’ (Friedman 1973). This normative arrangement may be a common tradition, practice or set of beliefs (MacIntyre 1967; Winch 1967), or it may be simply a common acknowledgement that some set of rules is required to avoid chaos. B’s compliance with A’s authority may take two forms: it may be unquestioning (as with Weber’s ‘charismatic authority’) or B may be able to criticize A’s command, yet still complies because B recognizes A’s right to command, even if B privately disagrees with its content.
Sixth, a further important distinction is that between being an authority and being in authority. The former concerns matters of belief; the latter concerns A’s place in a normative order with recognized positions of de jure authority. When A is an authority, A is held to have, or successfully claims, special knowledge, insight, expertise, and so on, which justifies B’s deference to A’s judgement. When A is in authority, A claims, and is recognized as occupying, a special institutional role with a co-ordinate sphere of command (as with Weber’s legal-rational authority (1978 [1922])). When B complies with A’s judgement where A is an authority, B’s compliance involves belief in the validity of A’s judgement; whereas, when A is simply in authority, B may disagree yet comply because B recognizes A’s de jure authority. Traditional and charismatic leaders are authoritative over belief and value; leaders in legal-rational systems are granted authority in certain spheres of action for convenience. Where A is an authority, A’s influence over B relies on B’s continued belief in A’s guaranteed judgement. Where A is in authority, A relies on B continuing to recognize that A fulfils a valuable co-ordination function. Both systems may face legitimation crises when B no longer believes A, or no longer believes that A successfully co-ordinates. However, both systems may seek to maintain B’s belief through a variety of techniques: ideology, hegemony, mobilization of bias, and so on (Habermas 1976 [1973]).
Mark Philp
University of Oxford
References
Arendt, H. (1963) ‘What is authority?’, in Between Past and Future, New York.
Friedman, R.B. (1973) ‘On the concept of authority in political philosophy’, in R.E.Flathman (ed.) Concepts in Social and Political Philosophy, New York.
Habermas, J. (1976 [1973]) Legitimation Crisis, London. (Original edn, Legitimations problem in Spatkapitalismus, Frankfurt.)
Hart, H.L.A. (1961) The Concept of Law, Oxford.
Hobbes, T. (1651) Leviathan, London.
Lukes, S. (1978) ‘Power and authority’, in T.Bottomore and R.Nisbett (eds) A History of Sociological Analysis, London.
MacIntyre, A. (1967) Secularisation and Moral Change, London.
Parsons, T. (1960) ‘Authority, legitimation, and political action’ , in Structure and Process in Modern Societies, Glencoe, IL.
Peters, R.S. (1967) ‘Authority’, in A.Quinton (ed.) Political Philosophy, Oxford.
Raz, J. (ed.) (1989) Authority, Oxford.
Weber, M. (1978 [1922]) Economy and Society, 2 vols, ed. G. Roth and C.Wittich, Berkeley, CA.
Winch, P. (1967) ‘Authority’, in A.Quinton (ed.) Political Philosophy, Oxford.
