Animal welfare is of general concern, beyond the narrow scope of biological psychology. All animals should be treated in a humane manner. Legislation in the United Kingdom and elsewhere governs, amongst many other things, the care of animals, their sale and transport, and the protection of endangered species. In many countries there is legislation specifically to protect the welfare of laboratory animals. Such legislation typically covers the maintenance of animals, the scientific procedures that can be applied, and the nature and location of the places where animals can be bred, kept and tested.
Legislation in the United Kingdom (the Animals [Scientific Procedures] Act 1986) lays down, for each SPECIES, appropriate measures for such things as housing (both the nature of the housing—each species should be kept in an environment appropriate to its natural behaviour—and the density of occupation), temperature, humidity and maintenance regimesthe delivery of food and water, how often bedding should be refreshed and cages cleaned, how often a veterinary surgeon must inspect the animals, and so on. In addition to these things, legislation also specifies such things as the institutional management structures and the record-keeping needed, and requires independent inspectors to monitor all aspects of laboratory animal maintenance and use. The manner in which animals should be destroyed on completion of experimentation is also regulated. The legislation specifies who can undertake which regulated procedures on laboratory animals, weighing what is done against the likely benefit that might accrue to medicine, veterinary science and basic science. Scientists in the United Kingdom are obliged to practise the three Rs: replacement, refinement and reduction.
That is, they are required by law always to consider replacing living animals with alternatives (TISSUE CULTURE methods or computer simulations for example); to refine the techniques used; and to reduce the numbers of animals used.
Animal welfare is an issue that arouses considerable passion, as do questions about the natures and rights of animals. Discussion of animal rights is necessarily complex, involving legal and moral problems that are beyond the scope of this entry. That humans can confer some kinds of rights on animals is beyond doubt: we can confer legal rights on whatever we wish, even abstractions. For example, limited liability companies have certain rights, statutorily enforceable. In this sense, animals have been conferred rights: legislation in the United Kingdom and elsewhere lays down the conditions under which laboratory animals must be kept, which in effect gives animals rights. Further, Parliament in New Zealand and several states in the United States of America have debated whether to give extensive rights, more or less equal to those enjoyed by all citizens, to chimpanzees and other apes. But all of these are essentially benefactions granted by humans to animals to ensure humane and proper treatment. Do animals have natural rights independent of social and legal structures? This is a much more vexed problem that raises questions about the nature of rights. For example, are there such things as natural rights, or do rights merely represent consensus among humans to do or not to do certain things? Is it necessary, in order to enjoy rights, to be cognizant of them and to accept responsibilities and duties that are entailed? Consult a philosopher about rights; Warnock (1998) provides a sensible starting point.
