Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib - Chapter 6, Part 1 Summary & Analysis

Seymour Hersh
This Study Guide consists of approximately 34 pages of chapter summaries, quotes, character analysis, themes, and more - everything you need to sharpen your knowledge of Chain of Command.

Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib - Chapter 6, Part 1 Summary & Analysis

Seymour Hersh
This Study Guide consists of approximately 34 pages of chapter summaries, quotes, character analysis, themes, and more - everything you need to sharpen your knowledge of Chain of Command.
This section contains 517 words
(approx. 2 pages at 400 words per page)
Buy the Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib Study Guide

Chapter 6, Part 1 Summary

The Pentagon's first reaction was anger when there were supply-line and reinforcement issues during the first week of the Iraq war in mid-March, 2003. Donald Rumsfeld had supposedly taken over the day-to-day running of the war, to the point where he overruled the military repeatedly. He also reduced ground troops numerous times, to where the forces' effectiveness was severely curtailed. Pentagon officials were shocked when Rumsfeld refused to use the Pentagon's centralized planning tool, the 'time-phased forces deployment list.' The military is a very inefficient organization—redundancies are necessary for its proper function. Rumsfeld wanted to streamline the operation, based on the first Gulf War. When TPFDL recommended a minimum of four army divisions, Rumsfeld rejected it as "too big." He felt one division plus air power could do the job. Several Joint Staff members who disagreed were replaced by officers...

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This section contains 517 words
(approx. 2 pages at 400 words per page)
Buy the Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib Study Guide
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