United Front Strategy
The United Front strategy grew from the belief of the Soviet Comintern, or international organization of Communist parties, that Communist groups in nations subject to foreign subjugation should form a united front with nationalists to gain their liberation before beginning their socialist revolutions. "Hostile classes," Lenin believed, "are united by a common interest in opposing foreign exploitation" (Schram 1969: 134). The strategy was first used in China and, after a successful start there, was also attempted in Korea. In the end, both attempts were unsuccessful, and the societal divisions that emerged remain in the divided Korean Peninsula and in the politically divided governments of China and Taiwan.
In China, until the Communist purge in 1927, the union of the Communists and Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party) led to the formation of a government with Communist participation; one Russian adviser even observed that members of the right-wing Guomindang were moving toward the left. This observation was premature with the brutal purge of the Communists by Chiang Kai-shek's (1887–1975) nationalist group, ending any hope of a strong united front to challenge Japanese imperialism in China.
In Korea, the United Front strategy was meant to create "a broad national revolutionary front that included handicraftsmen, the intelligentsia, and the petty and middle bourgeoisie along with the workers and peasants" (Scalapino and Lee 1972: 95). The structure for this front was the Korean National Party (KCP), formed in early 1926. This party was organized by Korean Communists in an attempt to form an alliance with Korean nationalists and thus placed Korean Communist Party members at its core. This attempt was weakened by the roundup of many KCP leaders by the Japanese after the funeral of former Emperor Sunjong in June 1926.
The formation of the Singanhoe (New Korean Society) in 1927 marked Korea's best opportunity to unify rival factions. The society, which accommodated a variety of groups ranging from the moderate to the radical, soon established a national network of 386 branches with more than seventy-five thousand members. The beginning of the end of the society came in 1929 when its leaders were rounded up by Japanese police and charged with lending support to the student riots in Kwangju in 1929. The society's subsequent move to the right caused many leftist members to quit, leading to its demise in 1931 and ending hope for a Korean united front against the Japanese.
These efforts by the Soviets to create united fronts in both China and Korea failed due to the political differences facing the leaders of the respective nationalist and conservative parties. These differences eventually erupted into civil wars in both nations, deepening divisions that persist in the twenty-first century.
Further Reading
Eckert, Carter J., Ki-baik Lee, Young Ick Lew, Michael
Robinson, and Edward W. Wagner. (1990) Korea Old and New: A History. Cambridge, MA: Korean Institute, Harvard University.
Scalapino, Robert A., and Chong-sik Lee. (1972) Communism in Korea. Vol 1. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Schram, Stuart R. (1969) The Political Thought of Mao Tse
Tung. Rev. ed. New York: Praeger Press.
This is the complete article, containing 503 words
(approx. 2 pages at 300 words per page).
