State [addendum]
In the past three centuries, states have replaced empires and tribes as the dominant form of political organization. But one clear lesson of the twentieth century is that the vast powers of states can be put to disastrous as well as beneficent ends.
Philosophical reflection about states often begins with Thomas Hobbes and the rational justification of social order as mutually advantageous. Many more contemporary philosophers have ignored the state, however, focusing instead on justice and the rights and liberties that states should respect. Indeed, the most important work in political philosophy in the twentieth century (Rawls 1972) does not discuss the state—it lacks even one entry for "the state" in its index.
In recent years there has, however, been a renewed interest in the state that has developed along several lines. Some have used modern game theory to pursue Hobbes's question of the possibility of a rational justification of the state. Others have studied the nature of the state itself and its relationship with other forms of social control, while some have questioned both the authority and the legitimacy of states. Another topic is the impact on states of global economic, social, and legal transformations.
Questions about the nature of states can be addressed either by considering the similarities and differences among states, nations and governments or by comparing states with other ways of maintaining social order. Nations and peoples are distinct from states, as evidenced by the fact that we often speak of "stateless" peoples such as Kurds and Palestinians. Nations and peoples are marked by common cultures and histories that provide the basis of a shared identity. Governments are also distinct from states: the head of the government in the United Kingdom (the prime minister) is not the head of state (the monarch is), just as the U.S. president is the head of state but not of the government as a whole. What, then, are states?
Unlike both ancient empires and the overlapping allegiances of feudal Europe, states claim sovereignty, and of a specific sort. Empires lacked clear territorial boundaries and often shared sovereignty with local rulers. In feudal Europe political power was fragmented among different and often overlapping jurisdictions that encompassed kings, lords, local rulers, bishops, and popes who demanded allegiance or taxes or both. Sovereign states differ from these forms of political control because they have a centralized and hierarchical organization ruling over a defined territory with established boundaries. A state also claims to be the ultimate source of legal authority and demands loyalty from all permanent inhabitants within its territory.
Although many assume that states' claims to authority and legitimacy could be vindicated—that states could be made just—anarchists have questioned both claims. Robert Paul Wolff (1976) attacked the state's authority by attacking authority in general. He argued that because people are responsible for their own decisions based on reasons that they understand to be relevant, the claimed authority of states is illegitimate. One cannot both accept responsibility for one's own actions and submit to the authority of the state, said Wolff. This claim has spurred Joseph Raz (1979) and others to look more closely at authority. Raz agrees that authority involves a type of surrender or acquiescence of judgment, though he denies that this is always contrary to reason. He explains by distinguishing first-order reasons (where we weigh competing reasons and act accordingly) from second-order reasons that "preempt" first-order reasons. The eclipsing of first-order reasons by the authority's judgment suggests that Wolf is right in casting doubt on the state's claim that it is always an authority, although it also implies that it is sometimes not a violation of autonomy to decide to act for second-order reasons.
Robert Nozick (1974) raised questions not only about the state's authority but also about the widely presumed legitimacy of the state's use of coercive power. The only legitimate exercise of coercive power, he argued, would be vastly different from powers states commonly claim. A legitimate state's power is limited, for example, by people's rights to refuse to join the state or to join only on terms that are voluntarily. While Nozick defends the state's use of coercion to protect rights to property and life, he questions whether the many other, familiar coercive measures are legitimate—measures ranging from paternalistic efforts to protect people against themselves to laws preventing self-regarding but immoral acts to taxes aimed at redistributing wealth and providing social services. In painting an attractive and purportedly workable picture of an anarchist society, both Wolff and Nozick have encouraged a fresh look at states' claims to authority and legitimacy as well as at alternative methods of maintaining social order.
Economic, legal, and social forces are also affecting states. States traditionally claim both internal sovereign control over populations and immunity from external power, yet both ideas have come under increasing pressure from many different angles. As the world has become smaller and more integrated and corporations do business in different states, it is often important for states to harmonize laws governing commerce and immigration. Adding to these pressures for more cooperation has come a need to meet growing international problems such as environmental degradation and terrorism—neither of which can be effectively addressed without the cooperation of other states. This greater interdependence of states, and their mutual vulnerability, has even sparked renewed interest in possible preemptive actions against states as a form of self-defense.
Alongside these challenges to the external sovereignty of states has come greater emphasis on human rights, further weakening states' claims of internal sovereignty over their own populations. International tribunals, nongovernment aid organizations, and sometimes unilateral military action in the name of helping citizens or protecting them from their own states have all challenged the supremacy of state power. Yet despite all these forces working to limit states' sovereignty, terrorism has also brought home the importance of avoiding "failed states" in which terrorists can train and plan. So although states are losing authority and sovereignty because of globalization, mutual interdependence, and growing legal limits on their power, the prospect of failed states breeding terrorists abroad and anarchy at home has strengthened the case of defenders of the state power.
Anarchism; Authority; First-Order Logic; Hobbes, Thomas; Justice; Liberty; Nozick, Robert; Political Philosophy, History Of; Rights; Sovereignty; Terrorism.
Bibliography
Fukuyama, Francis. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004.
Green, Leslie. The Authority of the State. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
Morris, Christopher. An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, 1974.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972.
Raz, Joseph. The Authority of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.
Wolff, Robert Paul. In Defense of Anarchism. 2nd ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1976.
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