Socialist Spiritual Civilization—China
After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted economic reform and liberalization policies in the late 1970s, many party members began to worry that if China pursued only the goals of economic development, society might advance in material terms but regress spiritually. The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) had done irrevocable damage to the Chinese moral universe. Unbridled pursuit of economic development now could lead to a society whose citizens were materially wealthy but selfish, grasping, and base. They would become psychologically alienated: suspicious and mistrustful of others and unable to cooperate either for the public or their own good. Eventually, material advancement itself would grind to a halt.
Concern mounted as Western films, television programs, and popular music surged into China in the early 1980s. Most of this popular culture would not normally be seen as seriously challenging the Chinese way of life, but older comrades, in particular, feared that in the spiritual vacuum that prevailed following the Cultural Revolution, even otherwise innocuous concepts and products could do great damage. They decided to launch a "campaign against spiritual pollution" in 1983 but had to cut it short after a few months when it started negatively affecting the economy. Clearly, in any contest between material and spiritual civilization, the CCP would favor the material. Nevertheless, the CCP did formally adopt "building a socialist spiritual civilization" as a fundamental government goal at a special CCP meeting in September 1986.
No one believes the CCP achieved this goal or even made significant progress toward it. The problem was twofold. First, there was no clearly articulated image of what a socialist spiritual civilization would look like. What should people think and do to build one? How should they change their behavior? Usually the answers were that people should "have lofty ideals," "proceed from a scientific spirit," "love genuinely beautiful things," and other vague banalities. They should also do the opposite of anything defined as bad in the present. For example, if corruption was defined as bad, they should not be corrupt; if spitting on the sidewalk was defined as bad, they should not spit.
Second, the incentive structures necessary to build material civilization frequently rewarded behaviors opposite to those necessary to build spiritual civilization. Too many "lofty ideals" and too much altruism would lead inexorably to failure in the brutally competitive economy. To get rich was undeniably glorious, but no individual could be assured that today's wealth would not be confiscated in some arbitrary way tomorrow. Self-protection took precedence over concern for the achievement of nebulous public goals. Eventually, a new antimorality took hold that stressed the "virtues" of not being so foolish as to take building a socialist spiritual civilization seriously.
Further Reading
Deng Xiaoping. (1987) Fundamental Issues in Present-Day China. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
Lynch, Daniel C. (1999) After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and "Thought Work" in Reformed China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
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