However, the same internal–external distinction may be drawn in the case of relations between universals and particulars and also in the case of relations between two or more universals. If one holds that for every property
P that a particular
X displays, there is a universal,
P-hood, to which
X stands in the relation of "exemplification," then
all of
X's properties may be construed as relational properties. Some of these relations of exemplification may be regarded as internal to
X and others as external. Again, one may say that a universal such as "manhood" stands in an internal relation to certain other universals (for example, "rationality") and in an external relation to other universals (for example, "philosopherhood"). Here the internal relation in question will be entailment, in the sense of "entails" in which we say that a given property ("being a man") entails another property ("being rational"). In what follows, however, we shall confine ourselves as far as possible to relations holding between particulars, both because the philosophical literature has focused on such relations and because the notions of "exemplification of universals" and of "relations of entailment holding between universals" are sufficiently obscure and controversial to require detailed supplementary discussions.
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