Nonalignment

Although the Cold War (1946–1991) divided the world into rival blocs, some nations preferred nonalignment. They avoided affiliation with either the United States and its First World allies or the Soviet Union and its Second World partners. Some of these nonaligned nations were traditional neutrals, such as Switzerland or Sweden, that stayed out of war. By the mid-1950s, however, many of the nonaligned were newly independent countries of Asia or Africa, numerous enough that they became known as the Third World.

Nonalignment sometimes made U.S. officials uneasy. During the 1950s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles criticized nonaligned nations for making a "shortsighted" or even "immoral" choice by not taking sides in what Dulles believed was a global contest between godless Communism and the "free world." He also disliked nonaligned leaders, such as Egypt's Gamel Abdel Nasser, who tried to exploit superpower rivalry by accepting aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet President Dwight D. Eisenhower understood that nonalignment was a way for some countries to preserve their independence in international affairs rather than a choice between "right and wrong." Eisenhower and other Cold War presidents engaged in complicated maneuvering with nonaligned nations to gain advantages, even if they could not secure allies.

Nonalignment sometimes seemed a desirable way to weaken Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. After Yugoslavia broke with the Soviet Union in 1948, the United States provided economic and military aid. President Harry S. Truman hoped that the example of Yugoslavia's independent Communism might create additional cracks in the Soviet bloc. He also thought that U.S. weapons would help deter a Soviet attack and encourage Yugoslavia to coordinate its defense with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Officials in both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations also thought nonalignment was Finland's best choice because the Soviets had forced the Finns to sign a treaty in 1947 prohibiting them from joining any anti-Soviet alliance. Even Dulles praised Finnish nonalignment and called on the Soviets to allow the nations they dominated in Eastern Europe the same degree of freedom.

Relations with some nonaligned nations in the Third World produced cooperation as well as conflict. After India gained independence from Great Britain in 1947, both Truman and Eisenhower bristled at Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's criticism of their foreign policies. Both presidents, however, provided economic aid to strengthen Indian democracy and counter Soviet efforts to gain Nehru's friendship. Yet Eisenhower's decision to sign a military alliance with Pakistan (1954) led to continuing friction with India. Relations with Indonesia were far worse. Fearing that Indonesia's nonaligned government was tilting toward Communism, Eisenhower authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to overthrow President Sukarno in 1957–1958. Sukarno survived, and the CIA's embarrassing public failure strained U.S. Indonesian relations for years.

By the mid-1960s, most European colonial empires had collapsed, and recently independent, nonaligned nations held a majority of seats in the United Nations. American officials sometimes complained that these nonaligned countries were hostile or obstructionist. But they also cooperated with one or both superpowers on some important international issues, such as the nuclear nonproliferation treaty of 1968. Nonalignment complicated the Cold War, and American officials counted both successes and failures in dealing with it.

Arms Control Debate; Containment and Détente; Communism and Anticommunism; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Neo-Isolationism.

Brands, H. W. The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947–1960. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989.

Hoopes, Townsend. The Devil and John Foster Dulles. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973.

Karabell, Zachary. Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third World, and the Cold War, 1946–1962. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999.

McMahon, Robert J. The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

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