Isolationism

Questions on this topic? Just ask!

Isolationism is the belief that the United States must limit its involvement in world affairs. Although deeply ingrained in the national character, isolationism grew into a dominant issue only after American participation in World War I. Prior to that war, isolationism took the form of an ideology that opposed imperialism and the existence of a standing army. It did not prevent significant American involvement in both Latin America and the Far East. By the late 1890s, as the nation moved toward war with Spain over the fate of Cuba, isolationism remained a relatively insignificant issue. The hesitancy of Presidents Grover Cleveland and William McKinley to wage war was attributable not to isolationist sentiment but rather to anti-imperialism, doubt over the prospects for successful Cuban self-government, and reluctance to fight a European power.

As America inched toward war with the Central Powers after the outbreak of World War I in the summer of 1914, isolationism once again failed to prove itself a deciding factor. From the outset of the conflict, the United States grew deeply involved as both creditor and munitions supplier to the nations fighting Germany while clinging to the traditional policy of neutrality in European affairs. Although the powerful Socialist Party of America and progressives from both major parties opposed American entrance in the war out of fear that domestic reform would suffer, their opposition did not prove decisive. Rather, divided ethnic loyalties, vain hopes for a U.S.-brokered diplomatic settlement, and the lack of a land force capable of large-scale intervention explain President Woodrow Wilson's decision to avoid entering the war until 1917.

Similarly, isolationism had far less to do with the Senate's rejection of the Versailles Treaty of 1919, which brought the war to a close and created the League of Nations, than did other issues. Many Senate opponents feared that membership in the League would limit American sovereignty by requiring the United States to join fellow League members in waging war against future aggressors. Others balked at membership in an organization that included both Asian and African nations, and some objected to the League's oversight of domestic affairs such as immigration and labor policy. Although Midwestern and Western progressives, known as the Irreconcilables, unequivocally opposed membership, fifty-three senators, reflecting prevailing public opinion, approved membership with few, if any, reservations. The ultimate failure of the Senate to approve membership had far more to do with political differences and President Wilson's refusal to compromise with the Senate's League opponents than with isolationism.

During the interwar period isolationism grew into a potent force. Americans were mourning their losses in World War I, and suspicion was growing that France, Britain, or even American finance and munitions interests had maneuvered Wilson into declaring war. Isolationism began to warp American diplomacy and slowed the nation's reaction to German, Italian, and Japanese aggression. It prompted the Senate to approve the 1935 Neutrality Act, requiring the United States to embargo all war material to belligerent powers; the 1936 Neutrality Act, forbidding U.S. loans to nations at war; and the 1937 Pittman Resolution, prohibiting Americans to travel on the ships of belligerent powers.

However, although these acts were an important gauge of public sentiment, they do not convey the complete picture. The force of isolationist sentiment should not, in fact, be overstated, as the United States remained an active participant in interwar world affairs. The United States supported naval disarmament at the 1921–1922 Washington Conference and the 1930 London Conference, and it pioneered the abolition of war in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact. Isolationist sentiment did not prevent the gradual expansion of the United States Navy during the 1930s nor its phenomenal growth after the fall of France in June 1940. Moreover, the army's meager growth is attributable in large part to America's traditional disdain for a large peacetime army coupled with the effects of the Great Depression rather than to isolationism.

Following France's surrender, concern for England's survival mounted, and interventionism gradually eclipsed isolationism. In September 1940 President Roosevelt announced his agreement with England in which England would receive fifty American destroyers in exchange for eight British bases. That same month Congress approved the first peacetime draft in American history. Following Roosevelt's reelection to an unprecedented third term in November 1940, the president moved swiftly to extend ever-greater aid to the Axis foes. In March 1941 Congress approved the Lend-Lease Act, with an initial appropriation of $7 billion. Over the next four months, Roosevelt extended U.S. naval patrols deep into the Atlantic, dispatched U.S. ground forces to Greenland and then Iceland, and froze Japanese assets in the United States.

In the final months before Pearl Harbor, isolationism proved troublesome but ever more negligible. Historians have pointed to polls indicating that more than 80 percent of the American public firmly opposed American entry into the war as late as October 1941. But public sentiment did not hamstring the president. In August Roosevelt met with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill for four days in Placentia Bay off the Newfoundland coast. The following month he ordered the Atlantic Fleet to shoot on sight any Axis warships in America's Atlantic neutrality zone. In November Congress dealt isolationists a body blow when it repealed the

1939 Neutrality Act, paving the way for U.S. vessels to convoy war material to Britain. Isolationism, in short, does not explain Roosevelt's decision to avoid war with the Axis in the autumn of 1941. Rather, with Lend-Lease aid flowing to the main Axis opponents and with industry and the armed forces still mobilizing for conflict, strategic interest dictated that the United States remain out of the global war.

With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, isolationist sentiment all but vanished. In July 1945 Congress approved the Bretton Woods agreement, which established both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. That same month the Senate approved the United Nations Charter with only two dissenting votes, committing America to an internationalist future.

Although a significant issue between the world wars, isolationism faded rapidly after 1941. With the onset of the Cold War in summer 1945 and the extraordinary demands that the global conflict forced on the United Sates, isolationism moved to the fringes of American society, where it has remained ever since.

Disarmament and Arms Control, 1898–1945; Peace Movements, 1898–1945; United Nations.

Dallek, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.

Dallek, Robert. The American Style of Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Leuchtenburg, William E. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932–1940. New York: Harper and Row, 1963.

Patterson Thomas, G.; Clifford, Garry J.; and Hagan, Kenneth J. American Foreign Relations, Vol. 4. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000.

This is the complete article, containing 1,145 words (approx. 4 pages at 300 words per page).