Intention

Intention

Philosophical work on intention is motivated by three general concerns. First, philosophers of action want to understand what it is for an event to be an intentional action and how intentional actions are produced by their agents. They have good reason to think hard about what intentions are and how they may be involved in the production of intentional actions, because, even if it is unclear exactly how intentional actions and intentions are related to each other, it is clear that they are intimately related. Second, moral philosophers and others in the business of developing theories of the evaluation of actions and their agents need an account of intentional action, and such an account is likely to involve intention in an important way. Moral evaluations of actions have intentional actions as their primary subject matter, even if people sometimes are proper targets of moral blame for some unintentional actions (e.g., when a drunk driver accidentally injures or kills someone). Third, some philosophers have the goal of crafting analyses of philosophically interesting concepts as they are reflected in ordinary language.

Intentions and Related States of Mind

It is generally agreed that intentions are closely linked to desires—especially action-desires, desires to do things—and beliefs.

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