Induction
The name "induction," derived from the Latin translation of Aristotle's epagoge, will be used here to cover all cases of nondemonstrative argument, in which the truth of the premises, while not entailing the truth of the conclusion, purports to be a good reason for belief in it. Such arguments may also be called "ampliative," as C. S. Peirce called them, because the conclusion may presuppose the existence of individuals whose existence is not presupposed by the premises.
Thus, the conclusion "All A are B" of an induction by simple enumeration may apply to A's not already mentioned in the finite number of premises having the form "Ai is B." Similarly, in eduction (or arguments from particulars to particulars) the conclusion "Any A is B" is intended to apply to any A not yet observed as being a B.
It would be convenient to have some such term as adduction to refer to the sense of induction here adopted, which is broader than the classical conception of induction as generalization from particular instances. Most philosophical issues concerning induction in the classical sense arise in connection with the more general case of nondemonstrative argument.
In what follows it will be convenient to use Jean Nicod's expression "primary inductions" to refer to those nondemonstrative arguments "whose premises do not derive their certainty or probability from any induction." Problems of philosophical justification are most acute in connection with such primary inductions.
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