Central Asia—China Relations | Research & Encyclopedia Articles

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, China faced the challenge of managing bilateral relations with the newly independent Central Asian states. The independence of these states exacerbated long-smoldering ethnic unrest in China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region, which borders several of the Central Asian states. After establishing relations with the Central Asian republics in early 1992, China signed more than twenty agreements on boundaries and economic and cultural cooperation with these nations within a short period.

The China–Central Asian boundary was originally established by "unequal" treaties—the 1860 Treaty of Beijing, the 1864 Protocol on the Northwest Boundary, the 1881 Sino-Russian Treaty of Ili, and the 1884 Sino-Russian Treaty of Kashgar. According to the Chinese, by these treaties, Czarist Russia gained 440,000 square kilometers of territory at the expense of China. After the independence of the Central Asian states, China was willing to accept the unequal treaties as the basis for new boundary agreements.

Following several years of negotiations, on 4 July 1996, China concluded a boundary agreement with Kyrgyzstan. China and Kyrgyzstan have since concluded agreements to open new border crossings and construct a rail line linking the two countries. On 4 July 1998, leaders signed a Sino-Kazakhstan boundary treaty. This marked the comprehensive settlement of questions unresolved by history concerning the unsettled 1,700-kilometer Sino-Kazakh boundary.

Beijing has not concluded an agreement resolving the historically complicated Sino-Tajik boundary dispute. China has consistently asserted that Russia violated the 1884 Sino-Russian Kashgar Boundary Treaty in 1892 and occupied more than 20,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory in the Pamir Mountains and that the boundary remains undelimited. Nevertheless, the leaders of the two nations have negotiated many agreements, including an agreement to open a road connecting China and Tajikistan to ease border trade.

The Central Asian states see China as a potential economic and demographic threat. One concern is China's dramatic population growth. With its large territory and abundant natural resources, Central Asia is logically a place for China to covet. More than 300,000 Chinese have settled in Central Asia, and this may grow to 500,000 over the next few years. Kazakh officials believe that if the flood of Chinese coming to Kazakhstan continues, Chinese will overwhelm Kazakhstan in ten to fifteen years. Chinese traders have purchased considerable amounts of real estate in Kyrgyzstan.

China is also very apprehensive about instability along the border. Following a Shanghai summit, on 26 April 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed an agreement with China on confidence-building measures along the border. On 24 April 1997 they agreed to withdraw military forces 100 kilometers along the 3,500-kilometers boundary. A third agreement of 3 July 1998 emphasized cooperation to dampen ethnic unrest in the region. Each government pledged to take steps to fight against arms smuggling and not to allow its territory to be used for activities undermining the national sovereignty, security, and social order of any of the five countries.

Since the independence of the Central Asian states in 1991, ethnic unrest in Xinjiang has been a major concern for Beijing. A continuing source of tension in China–Central Asian relations are the sensitive issues of pan-Turkic nationalism and the Xinjiang separatist movement. Historically, China has struggled to maintain central government control over the region. Russian and Soviet intrigue and local independence movements have been recent issues. An Eastern Turkestan Republic was briefly established in 1944, in what is now Xinjiang; it had a national anthem and a national flag—a white crescent and star against a blue background. Led by Islamic scholars, the Uighurs of Xinjiang wanted a homeland free of Chinese influence. In 1962 China crushed a revolt by tens of thousands of Kazakhs who then fled across the border to Soviet Kazakhstan. Chinese now feel that the smoldering independence movements in Xinjiang are the main threat to stability in western China.

A central issue in most all communiqués and agreements between China and other Central Asian states is a commitment not to support any separatist movements. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with 200,000 and 80,000 Uighurs respectively, have agreed to suppress such movements. Several separatist movements have moved from Kazakhstan to Turkey, and Kyrgyzstan has prevented organization of an ethnic Uighur political party. The Uighur nationalist organizations that continue to operate from within the Central Asian states remain a major cause of tension in Central Asian relations with China.

Countries with fundamentalist Islamic orientations are a factor in promoting ethnic unrest in the region. The Jamaʿat-e-Islami, based in Pakistan, has encouraged Islamic activism in Xinjiang, as have other Islamist movements, such as the Taliban (when it was in power in Afghanistan). Uighurs do receive religious training in Pakistan, and Afghan and Islamic militants have smuggled arms into China. The number of Islamic schools in China has grown rapidly; in 1997 the government closed down as many as three hundred "illegal" schools. Many small neighborhood mosques have become the focal point of anti-Chinese activities. The Chinese have clamped down on what it considers "illegal religious activities" and has closed many mosques.

The rise in ethnic unrest and pro-independence demonstrations and other activities in the 1990s have deep historical and religious roots and will persist for the foreseeable future. Many leaders are not simply religious fanatics, but are Pan-Turkic nationalists. The support for the movement comes from neighboring Turkic-speaking countries. Despite the pledge by the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan not to support the Xinjiang separatist movement, supporters of the movement openly operate from these countries. Uighurs living in Turkey also support the movement. Pan-Turkic nationalism and anti-Chinese colonialism are important causes of the unrest. Uighurs are trying to preserve their cultural identity and to resist the mass influx of Chinese settlers into their region.

In the 1990s Central Asia quickly became an important center of China's economic attention. Border trade is an important part of the growing economic ties. In 1989 Xinjiang's trade with Soviet Central Asia amounted to only $118.5 million. Trade has continued to grow and now accounts for 60 percent of the region's foreign trade. In 1995 total trade between China and Central Asia was an estimated $718 million, of which $500 million was accounted for by border trade. Since 1991, China has emerged as the second-largest trading partner for the Central Asian countries, significantly displacing Russian influence in the region. China is now Kazakhstan's major trading partner, and 25 percent of Kyrgyzstan's foreign trade is with China.

The development of oil and gas is an area of important strategic economic cooperation. In 1994 China signed an agreement with Turkmenistan to construct a Turkmenistan-China-Japan gas pipeline. In 1997 China won the bid to develop Kazakhstan's Uzen oil field and construct a 3,000-kilometer oil pipeline from Kazakhstan's Caspian oilfields at Tengiz to Xinjiang and then to China's eastern coast. Additionally, China signed agreements with Kazakhstan to develop the Aktyubinsk oil fields along the Russian-Kazakh border. Total Chinese investment in developing oil resources in Kazakhstan is estimated at $9.7 billion, equivalent to 50 percent of Kazakhstan's gross national product. These agreements are a clear indication that China and Central Asia are developing an important economic and strategic link. China not only is seeking to ensure its energy security for the future, but also is attempting to shift the focus of Central Asia's global vision toward China and away from Russia and Turkey.

Eric Hyer

Benson, Linda. (1990) The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

Burles, Mark. (1999) Chinese Policy toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Christian, David. (1998) A History of Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Christoffersen, Gaye. (1998) China's Intentions for Russian and Central Asian Oil and Gas. NBR Analysis Series, vol. 9, no. 2.

Hopkirk, Peter. (1994) The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia. New York: Kodansha.

Mandelbaum, Michael, ed. (1994) Central Asia and the World. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

Olcott, Martha Brill. (2000) Central Asia and China. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Snyder, Jed C., ed. (1995) After Empire: The Emerging Geopolitics of Central Asia. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.

This is the complete article, containing 1,339 words (approx. 4 pages at 300 words per page).