But to return to Punning. Having pursued the
History of a Punn, from its Original to its Downfal,
I shall here define it to be a Conceit arising from
the use of two Words that agree in the Sound, but differ
in the Sense. The only way therefore to try a
Piece of Wit, is to translate it into a different
Language: If it bears the Test, you may pronounce
it true; but if it vanishes in the Experiment, you
may conclude it to have been a Punn. In short,
one may say of a Punn, as the Countryman described
his Nightingale, that it is vox et praeterea nihil,
a Sound, and nothing but a Sound. On the contrary,
one may represent true Wit by the Description which
Aristinetus makes of a fine Woman; when she
is dressed she is Beautiful, when she is undressed
she is Beautiful; or as Mercerus has translated
it [more Emphatically]
Induitur, formosa est: Exuitur,
ipsa forma est.
[Footnote 1: fine]
* * * *
*
No. 62. Friday, May 11, 1711.
Addison.
‘Scribendi
recte sapere est et principium et fons.’
Hor.
Mr. Lock has an admirable Reflexion upon the
Difference of Wit and Judgment, whereby he endeavours
to shew the Reason why they are not always the Talents
of the same Person. His Words are as follows:
And hence, perhaps, may be given some
Reason of that common Observation, That Men who
have a great deal of Wit and prompt Memories, have
not always the clearest Judgment, or deepest Reason.
For Wit lying most in the Assemblage of Ideas, and
putting those together with Quickness and Variety,
wherein can be found any Resemblance or Congruity,
thereby to make up pleasant Pictures and agreeable
Visions in the Fancy; Judgment, on the contrary, lies
quite on the other Side, In separating carefully
one from another, Ideas wherein can be found the
least Difference, thereby to avoid being misled
by Similitude, and by Affinity to take one thing for
another. This is a way of proceeding quite
contrary to Metaphor and Allusion; wherein, for
the most part, lies that Entertainment and Pleasantry
of Wit which strikes so lively on the Fancy, and
is therefore so acceptable to all People. [1]
This is, I think, the best and most Philosophical
Account that I have ever met with of Wit, which generally,
though not always, consists in such a Resemblance
and Congruity of Ideas as this Author mentions.
I shall only add to it, by way of Explanation, That
every Resemblance of Ideas is not that which we call
Wit, unless it be such an one that gives Delight
and Surprise to the Reader: These two Properties
seem essential to Wit, more particularly the last
of them. In order therefore that the Resemblance
in the Ideas be Wit, it is necessary that the Ideas
should not lie too near one another in the Nature of
