Further, the Law commands the doing the deeds not
only of the brave man (as not leaving the ranks, nor
flying, nor throwing away one’s arms), but those
also of the perfectly self-mastering man, as abstinence
from adultery and wantonness; and those of the meek
man, as refraining from striking others or using abusive
language: and in like manner in respect of the
other virtues and vices commanding some things and
forbidding others, rightly if it is a good law, in
a way somewhat inferior if it is one extemporised.
Now this Justice is in fact perfect Virtue, yet not
simply so but as exercised towards one’s neighbour:
and for this reason Justice is thought oftentimes
to be the best of the Virtues, and
“neither Hesper nor the Morning-star
So worthy of our admiration:”
and in a proverbial saying we express the same;
“All virtue is in Justice comprehended.”
And it is in a special sense perfect Virtue because
it is the practice of perfect Virtue. And perfect
it is because he that has it is able to practise his
virtue towards his neighbour and not merely on himself;
I mean, there are many who can practise virtue in
the regulation of their own personal conduct who are
wholly unable to do it in transactions with [Sidenote:1130a]
their neighbour. And for this reason that saying
of Bias is thought to be a good one,
“Rule will show what a man is;”
for he who bears Rule is necessarily in contact with
others, i.e. in a community. And for this
same reason Justice alone of all the Virtues is thought
to be a good to others, because it has immediate relation
to some other person, inasmuch as the Just man does
what is advantageous to another, either to his ruler
or fellow-subject. Now he is the basest of men
who practises vice not only in his own person but towards
his friends also; but he the best who practises virtue
not merely in his own person but towards his neighbour,
for this is a matter of some difficulty.
However, Justice in this sense is not a part of Virtue
but is co-extensive with Virtue; nor is the Injustice
which answers to it a part of Vice but co-extensive
with Vice. Now wherein Justice in this sense
differs from Virtue appears from what has been said:
it is the same really, but the point of view is not
the same: in so far as it has respect to one’s
neighbour it is Justice, in so far as it is such and
such a moral state it is simply Virtue.
But the object of our inquiry is Justice, in the sense
in which it is a part of Virtue (for there is such
a thing, as we commonly say), and likewise with respect
to particular Injustice. And of the existence
of this last the following consideration is a proof:
there are many vices by practising which a man acts
unjustly, of course, but does not grasp at more than
his share of good; if, for instance, by reason of cowardice
