[Sidenote:1122a] The other class again who are Stingy
in respect of receiving exceed in that they receive
anything from any source; such as they who work at
illiberal employments, brothel keepers, and such-like,
and usurers who lend small sums at large interest:
for all these receive from improper sources, and improper
amounts. Their common characteristic is base-gaining,
since they all submit to disgrace for the sake of gain
and that small; because those who receive great things
neither whence they ought, nor what they ought (as
for instance despots who sack cities and plunder temples),
we denominate wicked, impious, and unjust, but not
Stingy.
Now the dicer and bath-plunderer and the robber belong
to the class of the Stingy, for they are given to
base gain: both busy themselves and submit to
disgrace for the sake of gain, and the one class incur
the greatest dangers for the sake of their booty,
while the others make gain of their friends to whom
they ought to be giving.
So both classes, as wishing to make gain from improper
sources, are given to base gain, and all such receivings
are Stingy. And with good reason is Stinginess
called the contrary of Liberality: both because
it is a greater evil than Prodigality, and because
men err rather in this direction than in that of the
Prodigality which we have spoken of as properly and
completely such.
Let this be considered as what we have to say respecting
Liberality and the contrary vices.
Next in order would seem to come a dissertation on
Magnificence, this being thought to be, like liberality,
a virtue having for its object-matter Wealth; but
it does not, like that, extend to all transactions
in respect of Wealth, but only applies to such as are
expensive, and in these circumstances it exceeds liberality
in respect of magnitude, because it is (what the very
name in Greek hints at) fitting expense on a large
scale: this term is of course relative: I
mean, the expenditure of equipping and commanding a
trireme is not the same as that of giving a public
spectacle: “fitting” of course also
is relative to the individual, and the matter wherein
and upon which he has to spend. And a man is
not denominated Magnificent for spending as he should
do in small or ordinary things, as, for instance,
“Oft to the wandering beggar did
I give,”
but for doing so in great matters: that is to
say, the Magnificent man is liberal, but the liberal
is not thereby Magnificent. The falling short
of such a state is called Meanness, the exceeding it
Vulgar Profusion, Want of Taste, and so on; which
are faulty, not because they are on an excessive scale
in respect of right objects but, because they show
off in improper objects, and in improper manner:
of these we will speak presently. The Magnificent
man is like a man of skill, because he can see what
is fitting, and can spend largely in good taste; for,
as we said at the commencement, [Sidenote: 1122b]
the confirmed habit is determined by the separate
acts of working, and by its object-matter.
