All these particulars, in one and the same case, no
man in his senses could be ignorant of; plainly not
of the agent, being himself. But what he is doing
a man may be ignorant, as men in speaking say a thing
escaped them unawares; or as Aeschylus did with respect
to the Mysteries, that he was not aware that it was
unlawful to speak of them; or as in the case of that
catapult accident the other day the man said he discharged
it merely to display its operation. Or a person
might suppose a son to be an enemy, as Merope did;
or that the spear really pointed was rounded off;
or that the stone was a pumice; or in striking with
a view to save might kill; or might strike when merely
wishing to show another, as people do in sham-fighting.
Now since ignorance is possible in respect to all
these details in which the action consists, he that
acted in ignorance of any of them is thought to have
acted involuntarily, and he most so who was in ignorance
as regards the most important, which are thought to
be those in which the action consists, and the result.
Further, not only must the ignorance be of this kind,
to constitute an action involuntary, but it must be
also understood that the action is followed by pain
and regret.
Now since all involuntary action is either upon compulsion
or by reason of ignorance, Voluntary Action would
seem to be “that whose origination is in the
agent, he being aware of the particular details in
which the action consists.”
For, it may be, men are not justified by calling those
actions involuntary, which are done by reason of Anger
or Lust.
Because, in the first place, if this be so no other
animal but man, and not even children, can be said
to act voluntarily. Next, is it meant that we
never act voluntarily when we act from Lust or Anger,
or that we act voluntarily in doing what is right
and involuntarily in doing what is discreditable?
The latter supposition is absurd, since the cause
is one and the same. Then as to the former, it
is a strange thing to maintain actions to be involuntary
which we are bound to grasp at: now there are
occasions on which anger is a duty, and there are things
which we are bound to lust after, health, for instance,
and learning.
Again, whereas actions strictly involuntary are thought
to be attended with pain, those which are done to
gratify lust are thought to be pleasant.
Again: how does the involuntariness make any
difference between wrong actions done from deliberate
calculation, and those done by reason of anger? for
both ought to be avoided, and the irrational feelings
are thought to be just as natural to man as reason,
and so of course must be such actions of the individual
as are done from Anger and Lust. It is absurd
then to class these actions among the involuntary.
II
Having thus drawn out the distinction between voluntary
and involuntary action our next step is to examine
into the nature of Moral Choice, because this seems
most intimately connected with Virtue and to be a
more decisive test of moral character than a man’s
acts are.
