And of these first principles some are obtained by
induction, some by perception, some by a course of
habituation, others in other different ways.
And we must try to trace up each in their own nature,
and take pains to secure their being well defined,
because they have great influence on what follows:
it is thought, I mean, that the starting-point or
principle is more than half the whole matter, and that
many of the points of inquiry come simultaneously into
view thereby.
We must now inquire concerning Happiness, not only
from our conclusion and the data on which our reasoning
proceeds, but likewise from what is commonly said
about it: because with what is true all things
which really are are in harmony, but with that which
is false the true very soon jars.
Now there is a common division of goods into three
classes; one being called external, the other two
those of the soul and body respectively, and those
belonging to the soul we call most properly and specially
good. Well, in our definition we assume that the
actions and workings of the soul constitute Happiness,
and these of course belong to the soul. And so
our account is a good one, at least according to this
opinion, which is of ancient date, and accepted by
those who profess philosophy. Rightly too are
certain actions and workings said to be the end, for
thus it is brought into the number of the goods of
the soul instead of the external. Agreeing also
with our definition is the common notion, that the
happy man lives well and does well, for it has been
stated by us to be pretty much a kind of living well
and doing well.
But further, the points required in Happiness are
found in combination in our account of it.
For some think it is virtue, others practical wisdom,
others a kind of scientific philosophy; others that
it is these, or else some one of them, in combination
with pleasure, or at least not independently of it;
while others again take in external prosperity.
Of these opinions, some rest on the authority of numbers
or antiquity, others on that of few, and those men
of note: and it is not likely that either of
these classes should be wrong in all points, but be
right at least in some one, or even in most.
Now with those who assert it to be Virtue (Excellence),
or some kind of Virtue, our account agrees: for
working in the way of Excellence surely belongs to
Excellence.
And there is perhaps no unimportant difference between
conceiving of the Chief Good as in possession or as
in use, in other words, as a mere state or as a working.
For the state or habit may possibly exist in a subject
without effecting any good, as, for instance, in him
who is asleep, or in any other way inactive; but the
working cannot so, for it will of necessity act, and
act well. And as at the Olympic games it is not
the finest and strongest men who are crowned, but they
who enter the lists, for out of these the prize-men
are selected; so too in life, of the honourable and
the good, it is they who act who rightly win the prizes.
