Solon perhaps drew a fair picture of the Happy, when
he said that they are men moderately supplied with
external goods, and who have achieved the most noble
deeds, as he thought, and who have lived with perfect
self-mastery: for it is quite possible for men
of moderate means to act as they ought.
Anaxagoras also seems to have conceived of the Happy
man not as either rich or powerful, saying that he
should not wonder if he were accounted a strange man
in the judgment of the multitude: for they judge
by outward circumstances of which alone they have
any perception.
And thus the opinions of the Wise seem to be accordant
with our account of the matter: of course such
things carry some weight, but truth, in matters of
moral action, is judged from facts and from actual
life, for herein rests the decision. So what
we should do is to examine the preceding statements
by referring them to facts and to actual life, and
when they harmonise with facts we may accept them,
when they are at variance with them conceive of them
as mere theories.
Now he that works in accordance with, and pays observance
to, Pure Intellect, and tends this, seems likely to
be both in the best frame of mind and dearest to the
Gods: because if, as is thought, any care is
bestowed on human things by the Gods then it must be
reasonable to think that they take pleasure in what
is best and most akin to themselves (and this must
be the Pure Intellect); and that they requite with
kindness those who love and honour this most, as paying
observance to what is dear to them, and as acting
rightly and nobly. And it is quite obvious that
the man of Science chiefly combines all these:
he is therefore dearest to the Gods, and it is probable
that he is at the same time most Happy.
Thus then on this view also the man of Science will
be most Happy.
Now then that we have said enough in our sketchy kind
of way on these subjects; I mean, on the Virtues,
and also on Friendship and Pleasure; are we to suppose
that our original purpose is completed? Must
we not rather acknowledge, what is commonly said, that
in matters of moral action mere Speculation and Knowledge
is not the real End but rather Practice: and
if so, then neither in respect of Virtue is Knowledge
enough; we must further strive to have and exert it,
and take whatever other means there are of becoming
good.
Now if talking and writing were of themselves sufficient
to make men good, they would justly, as Theognis observes
have reaped numerous and great rewards, and the thing
to do would be to provide them: but in point
of fact, while they plainly have the power to guide
and stimulate the generous among the young and to
base upon true virtuous principle any noble and truly
high-minded disposition, they as plainly are powerless
to guide the mass of men to Virtue and goodness; because
it is not their nature to be amenable to a sense of
