To all our elders also the honour befitting their
age, by rising up in their presence, turning out of
the way for them, and all similar marks of respect:
to our companions again, or brothers, frankness and
free participation in all we have. And to those
of the same family, or tribe, or city, with ourselves,
and all similarly connected with us, we should constantly
try to render their due, and to discriminate what belongs
to each in respect of nearness of connection, or goodness,
or intimacy: of course in the case of those of
the same class the discrimination is easier; in that
of those who are in different classes it is a matter
of more trouble. This, however, should not be
a reason for giving up the attempt, but we must observe
the distinctions so far as it is practicable to do
so.
A question is also raised as to the propriety of dissolving
or not dissolving those Friendships the parties to
which do not remain what they were when the connection
was formed.
[Sidenote: 1165b] Now surely in respect of those
whose motive to Friendship is utility or pleasure
there can be nothing wrong in breaking up the connection
when they no longer have those qualities; because they
were friends [not of one another, but] of those qualities:
and, these having failed, it is only reasonable to
expect that they should cease to entertain the sentiment.
But a man has reason to find fault if the other party,
being really attached to him because of advantage
or pleasure, pretended to be so because of his moral
character: in fact, as we said at the commencement,
the most common source of quarrels between friends
is their not being friends on the same grounds as
they suppose themselves to be.
Now when a man has been deceived in having supposed
himself to excite the sentiment of Friendship by reason
of his moral character, the other party doing nothing
to indicate he has but himself to blame: but when
he has been deceived by the pretence of the other
he has a right to find fault with the man who has
so deceived him, aye even more than with utterers
of false coin, in proportion to the greater preciousness
of that which is the object-matter of the villany.
But suppose a man takes up another as being a good
man, who turns out, and is found by him, to be a scoundrel,
is he bound still to entertain Friendship for him?
or may we not say at once it is impossible? since
it is not everything which is the object-matter of
Friendship, but only that which is good; and so there
is no obligation to be a bad man’s friend, nor,
in fact, ought one to be such: for one ought not
to be a lover of evil, nor to be assimilated to what
is base; which would be implied, because we have said
before, like is friendly to like.
Are we then to break with him instantly? not in all
cases; only where our friends are incurably depraved;
when there is a chance of amendment we are bound to
aid in repairing the moral character of our friends
even more than their substance, in proportion as it
is better and more closely related to Friendship.
Still he who should break off the connection is not
to be judged to act wrongly, for he never was a friend
to such a character as the other now is, and therefore,
since the man is changed and he cannot reduce him
to his original state, he backs out of the connection.
