Attendant then on each form of Political Constitution
there plainly is Friendship exactly co-extensive with
the principle of Justice; that between a King and
his Subjects being in the relation of a superiority
of benefit, inasmuch as he benefits his subjects; it
being assumed that he is a good king and takes care
of their welfare as a shepherd tends his flock; whence
Homer (to quote him again) calls Agamemnon, “shepherd
of the people.” And of this same kind is
the Paternal Friendship, only that it exceeds the
former in the greatness of the benefits done; because
the father is the author of being (which is esteemed
the greatest benefit) and of maintenance and education
(these things are also, by the way, ascribed to ancestors
generally): and by the law of nature the father
has the right of rule over his sons, ancestors over
their descendants, and the king over his subjects.
These friendships are also between superiors and inferiors,
for which reason parents are not merely loved but
also honoured. The principle of Justice also
between these parties is not exactly the same but according
to proportiton, because so also is the Friendship.
Now between Husband and Wife there is the same Friendship
as in Aristocracy: for the relation is determined
by relative excellence, and the better person has
the greater good and each has what befits: so
too also is the principle of Justice between them.
The Fraternal Friendship is like that of Companions,
because brothers are equal and much of an age, and
such persons have generally like feelings and like
dispositions. Like to this also is the Friendship
of a Timocracy, because the citizens are intended
to be equal and equitable: rule, therefore, passes
from hand to hand, and is distributed on equal terms:
so too is the Friendship accordingly.
[Sidenote: 1161b] In the deflections from the
constitutional forms, just as the principle of Justice
is but small so is the Friendship also: and least
of all in the most perverted form: in Despotism
there is little or no Friendship. For generally
wherever the ruler and the ruled have nothing in common
there is no Friendship because there is no Justice;
but the case is as between an artisan and his tool,
or between soul and body, and master and slave; all
these are benefited by those who use them, but towards
things inanimate there is neither Friendship nor Justice:
nor even towards a horse or an ox, or a slave qua
slave, because there is nothing in common: a
slave as such is an animate tool, a tool an inanimate
slave. Qua slave, then, there is no Friendship
towards him, only qua man: for it is thought
that there is some principle of Justice between every
man, and every other who can share in law and be a
party to an agreement; and so somewhat of Friendship,
in so far as he is man. So in Despotisms the
Friendships and the principle of Justice are inconsiderable
in extent, but in Democracies they are most considerable
because they who are equal have much in common.
