Well, this Friendship is perfect both in respect of
the time and in all other points; and exactly the
same and similar results accrue to each party from
the other; which ought to be the case between friends.
[Sidenote: II57a] The friendship based upon the
pleasurable is, so to say, a copy of this, since the
good are sources of pleasure to one another:
and that based on utility likewise, the good being
also useful to one another. Between men thus
connected Friendships are most permanent when the
same result accrues to both from one another, pleasure,
for instance; and not merely so but from the same source,
as in the case of two men of easy pleasantry; and
not as it is in that of a lover and the object of
his affection, these not deriving their pleasure from
the same causes, but the former from seeing the latter
and the latter from receiving the attentions of the
former: and when the bloom of youth fades the
Friendship sometimes ceases also, because then the
lover derives no pleasure from seeing and the object
of his affection ceases to receive the attentions
which were paid before: in many cases, however,
people so connected continue friends, if being of similar
tempers they have come from custom to like one another’s
disposition.
Where people do not interchange pleasure but profit
in matters of Love, the Friendship is both less intense
in degree and also less permanent: in fact, they
who are friends because of advantage commonly part
when the advantage ceases; for, in reality, they never
were friends of one another but of the advantage.
So then it appears that from motives of pleasure or
profit bad men may be friends to one another, or good
men to bad men or men of neutral character to one
of any character whatever: but disinterestedly,
for the sake of one another, plainly the good alone
can be friends; because bad men have no pleasure even
in themselves unless in so far as some advantage arises.
And further, the Friendship of the good is alone superior
to calumny; it not being easy for men to believe a
third person respecting one whom they have long tried
and proved: there is between good men mutual
confidence, and the feeling that one’s friend
would never have done one wrong, and all other such
things as are expected in Friendship really worthy
the name; but in the other kinds there is nothing to
prevent all such suspicions.
I call them Friendships, because since men commonly
give the name of friends to those who are connected
from motives of profit (which is justified by political
language, for alliances between states are thought
to be contracted with a view to advantage), and to
those who are attached to one another by the motive
of pleasure (as children are), we may perhaps also
be allowed to call such persons friends, and say there
are several species of Friendship; primarily and specially
that of the good, in that they are good, and the rest
only in the way of resemblance: I mean, people
connected otherwise are friends in that way in which
there arises to them somewhat good and some mutual
resemblance (because, we must remember the pleasurable
is good to those who are fond of it).
