But we may say more: an inquiry into their nature
is absolutely necessary. First, because we maintained
that Moral Virtue and Moral Vice are both concerned
with Pains and Pleasures: next, because the greater
part of mankind assert that Happiness must include
Pleasure (which by the way accounts for the word they
use, makarioz; chaireiu being the root of that word).
Now some hold that no one Pleasure is good, either
in itself or as a matter of result, because Good and
Pleasure are not identical. Others that some
Pleasures are good but the greater number bad.
There is yet a third view; granting that every Pleasure
is good, still the Chief Good cannot possibly be Pleasure.
In support of the first opinion (that Pleasure is
utterly not-good) it is urged that:
I. Every Pleasure is a sensible process towards a
complete state; but no such process is akin to the
end to be attained: e.g. no process of
building to the completed house.
2. The man of Perfected Self-Mastery avoids Pleasures.
3. The man of Practical Wisdom aims at avoiding
Pain, not at attaining Pleasure.
4. Pleasures are an impediment to thought, and
the more so the more keenly they are felt. An
obvious instance will readily occur.
5. Pleasure cannot be referred to any Art:
and yet every good is the result of some Art.
6. Children and brutes pursue Pleasures.
In support of the second (that not all Pleasures are
good), That there are some base and matter of reproach,
and some even hurtful: because some things that
are pleasant produce disease.
In support of the third (that Pleasure is not the
Chief Good), That it is not an End but a process towards
creating an End.
This is, I think, a fair account of current views
on the matter.
But that the reasons alleged do not prove it either
to be not-good or the Chief Good is plain from the
following considerations.
First. Good being either absolute or relative,
of course the natures and states embodying it will
be so too; therefore also the movements and the processes
of creation. So, of those which are thought to
be bad some will be bad absolutely, but relatively
not bad, perhaps even choiceworthy; some not even
choiceworthy relatively to any particular person,
only at certain times or for a short time but not in
themselves choiceworthy.
Others again are not even Pleasures at all though
they produce that impression on the mind: all
such I mean as imply pain and whose purpose is cure;
those of sick people, for instance.
Next, since Good may be either an active working or
a state, those [Greek: kinaeseis or geneseis]
which tend to place us in our natural state are pleasant
incidentally because of that [Sidenote: 1153a]
tendency: but the active working is really in
the desires excited in the remaining (sound) part
of our state or nature: for there are Pleasures
which have no connection with pain or desire:
the acts of contemplative intellect, for instance,
in which case there is no deficiency in the nature
or state of him who performs the acts.
