So then, of these inclinations, a man may sometimes
merely have one without yielding to it: I mean,
suppose that Phalaris had restrained his unnatural
desire to eat a child: or he may both have and
yield to it. As then Vice when such as belongs
to human nature is called Vice simply, while the other
is so called with the addition of “brutish”
or “morbid,” but not simply Vice, so manifestly
there is Brutish and Morbid Imperfection of Self-Control,
but that alone is entitled to the name without any
qualification which is of the nature of utter absence
of Self-Control, as it is found in Man.
VI
It is plain then that the object-matter of Imperfect
Self-Control and Self-Control is restricted to the
same as that of utter absence of Self-Control and
that of Perfected Self-Mastery, and that the rest is
the object-matter of a different species so named metaphorically
and not simply: we will now examine the position,
“that Imperfect Self-Control in respect of Anger
is less disgraceful than that in respect of Lusts.”
In the first place, it seems that Anger does in a
way listen to Reason but mishears it; as quick servants
who run out before they have heard the whole of what
is said and then mistake the order; dogs, again, bark
at the slightest stir, before they have seen whether
it be friend or foe; just so Anger, by reason of its
natural heat and quickness, listening to Reason, but
without having heard the command of Reason, rushes
to its revenge. That is to say, Reason or some
impression on the mind shows there is insolence or
contempt in the offender, and then Anger, reasoning
as it were that one ought to fight against what is
such, fires up immediately: whereas Lust, if Reason
or Sense, as the case may be, merely says a thing
is sweet, rushes to the enjoyment of it: and
so Anger follows Reason in a manner, but Lust does
not and is therefore more disgraceful: because
he that cannot control his anger yields in a manner
to Reason, but the other to his Lust and not to Reason
at all. [Sidenote:1149b]
Again, a man is more excusable for following such
desires as are natural, just as he is for following
such Lusts as are common to all and to that degree
in which they are common. Now Anger and irritability
are more natural than Lusts when in excess and for
objects not necessary. (This was the ground of
the defence the man made who beat his father, “My
father,” he said, “used to beat his, and
his father his again, and this little fellow here,”
pointing to his child, “will beat me when he
is grown a man: it runs in the family.”
And the father, as he was being dragged along, bid
his son leave off beating him at the door, because
he had himself been used to drag his father so far
and no farther.)
Again, characters are less unjust in proportion as
they involve less insidiousness. Now the Angry
man is not insidious, nor is Anger, but quite open:
but Lust is: as they say of Venus,
