As to the manner in which the ignorance is removed
and the man of Imperfect Self-Control recovers his
Knowledge, the account is the same as with respect
to him who is drunk or asleep, and is not peculiar
to this affection, so physiologists are the right
people to apply to. But whereas the minor premiss
of every practical syllogism is an opinion on matter
cognisable by Sense and determines the actions; he
who is under the influence of passion either has not
this, or so has it that his having does not amount
to knowing but merely saying, as a man when
drunk might repeat Empedocles’ verses; and because
the minor term is neither universal, nor is thought
to have the power of producing Knowledge in like manner
as the universal term: and so the result which
Socrates was seeking comes out, that is to say, the
affection does not take place in the presence of that
which is thought to be specially and properly Knowledge,
nor is this dragged about by reason of the affection,
but in the presence of that Knowledge which is conveyed
by Sense.
Let this account then be accepted of the question
respecting the failure in Self-Control, whether it
is with Knowledge or not; and, if with knowledge,
with what kind of knowledge such failure is possible.
IV
The next question to be discussed is whether there
is a character to be designated by the term “of
Imperfect Self-Control” simply, or whether all
who are so are to be accounted such, in respect of
some particular thing; and, if there is such a character,
what is his object-matter.
Now that pleasures and pains are the object-matter
of men of Self-Control and of Endurance, and also
of men of Imperfect Self-Control and Softness, is
plain.
Further, things which produce pleasure are either
necessary, or objects of choice in themselves but
yet admitting of excess. All bodily things which
produce pleasure are necessary; and I call such those
which relate to food and other grosser appetities,
in short such bodily things as we assumed were the
Object-matter of absence of Self-Control and of Perfected
Self-Mastery.
The other class of objects are not necessary, but
objects of choice in themselves: I mean, for
instance, victory, honour, wealth, and such-like good
or pleasant things. And those who are excessive
in their liking for such things contrary to the principle
of Right Reason which is in their own breasts we do
not designate men of Imperfect Self-Control simply,
but with the addition of the thing wherein, as in respect
of money, or gain, or honour, or anger, and not simply;
because we consider them as different characters and
only having that title in right of a kind of resemblance
(as when we add to a man’s name “conqueror
in the Olympic games” the account of him as
Man differs but little from the account of him as
the Man who conquered in the Olympic games, but still
it is different). And a proof of the real [Sidenote:
1148a] difference between these so designated with
an addition and those simply so called is this, that
Imperfect Self-Control is blamed, not as an error merely
but also as being a vice, either wholly or partially;
but none of these other cases is so blamed.
