(Syllogism, of course there may be without such premisses,
but it will not be demonstration because it will not
produce knowledge).
True, they must be, because it is impossible
to know that which is not.
First, that is indemonstrable, because, if
demonstrable, he cannot be said to know them
who has no demonstration of them for knowing such
things as are demonstrable is the same as having demonstration
of them.
Causes they must be, and better known,
and prior in time, causes, because we
then know when we are acquainted with the cause, and
prior, if causes, and known beforehand,
not merely comprehended in idea but known to exist
(The terms prior, and better known, bear two senses
for prior by nature and prior relatively
to ourselves are not the same, nor better known
by nature, and better known to us I mean,
by prior and better known relatively to ourselves,
such things as are nearer to sensation, but abstractedly
so such as are further Those are furthest which are
most universal those nearest which are particulars,
and these are mutually opposed) And by first,
I mean principles akin to the conclusion, for
principle means the same as first And the principle
or first step in demonstration is a proposition incapable
of syllogistic proof, i. e. one to which there is none
prior. Now of such syllogistic principles I call
that a [Greek: thxsis] which you cannot demonstrate,
and which is unnecessary with a view to learning something
else. That which is necessary in order to learn
something else is an Axiom.
Further, since one is to believe and know the thing
by having a syllogism of the kind called demonstration,
and what constitutes it to be such is the nature of
the premisses, it is necessary not merely to know
before, but to know better than the conclusion,
either all or at least some of, the principles, because
that which is the cause of a quality inhering in something
else always inheres itself more as the cause of our
loving is itself more lovable. So, since the principles
are the cause of our knowing and behoving we know
and believe them more, because by reason of them we
know also the conclusion following.
Further: the man who is to have the Knowledge
which comes through demonstration must not merely
know and believe his principles better than he does
his conclusion, but he must believe nothing more firmly
than the contradictories of those principles out of
which the contrary fallacy may be constructed:
since he who knows, is to be simply and absolutely
infallible.
