It is clear, therefore, that a man cannot be a Practically-Wise,
without being a good, man.
XIII
[Sidenote:1144b] We must inquire again also about
Virtue: for it may be divided into Natural Virtue
and Matured, which two bear to each other a relation
similar to that which Practical Wisdom bears to Cleverness,
one not of identity but resemblance. I speak
of Natural Virtue, because men hold that each of the
moral dispositions attach to us all somehow by nature:
we have dispositions towards justice, self-mastery
and courage, for instance, immediately from our birth:
but still we seek Goodness in its highest sense as
something distinct from these, and that these dispositions
should attach to us in a somewhat different fashion.
Children and brutes have these natural states, but
then they are plainly hurtful unless combined with
an intellectual element: at least thus much is
matter of actual experience and observation, that as
a strong body destitute of sight must, if set in motion,
fall violently because it has not sight, so it is
also in the case we are considering: but if it
can get the intellectual element it then excels in
acting. Just so the Natural State of Virtue,
being like this strong body, will then be Virtue in
the highest sense when it too is combined with the
intellectual element.
So that, as in the case of the Opinionative faculty,
there are two forms, Cleverness and Practical Wisdom;
so also in the case of the Moral there are two, Natural
Virtue and Matured; and of these the latter cannot
be formed without Practical Wisdom.
This leads some to say that all the Virtues are merely
intellectual Practical Wisdom, and Socrates was partly
right in his inquiry and partly wrong: wrong
in that he thought all the Virtues were merely intellectual
Practical Wisdom, right in saying they were not independent
of that faculty.
A proof of which is that now all, in defining Virtue,
add on the “state” [mentioning also to
what standard it has reference, namely that] “which
is accordant with Right Reason:” now “right”
means in accordance with Practical Wisdom. So
then all seem to have an instinctive notion that that
state which is in accordance with Practical Wisdom
is Virtue; however, we must make a slight change in
their statement, because that state is Virtue, not
merely which is in accordance with but which implies
the possession of Right Reason; which, upon such matters,
is Practical Wisdom. The difference between us
and Socrates is this: he thought the Virtues
were reasoning processes (i.e. that they were
all instances of Knowledge in its strict sense), but
we say they imply the possession of Reason.
From what has been said then it is clear that one
cannot be, strictly speaking, good without Practical
Wisdom nor Practically-Wise without moral goodness.
