It is obvious, moreover, that being Unjustly dealt
by and dealing Unjustly by others are both wrong;
because the one is having less, the other having more,
than the mean, and the case is parallel to that of
the healthy in the healing art, and that of good condition
in the art of training: but still the dealing
Unjustly by others is the worst of the two, because
this involves wickedness and is blameworthy; wickedness,
I mean, either wholly, or nearly so (for not all voluntary
wrong implies injustice), but the being Unjustly dealt
by does not involve wickedness or injustice.
[Sidenote: 1138b] In itself then, the being Unjustly
dealt by is the least bad, but accidentally it may
be the greater evil of the two. However, scientific
statement cannot take in such considerations; a pleurisy,
for instance, is called a greater physical evil than
a bruise: and yet this last may be the greater
accidentally; it may chance that a bruise received
in a fall may cause one to be captured by the enemy
and slain.
Further: Just, in the way of metaphor and similitude,
there may be I do not say between a man and himself
exactly but between certain parts of his nature; but
not Just of every kind, only such as belongs to the
relation of master and slave, or to that of the head
of a family. For all through this treatise the
rational part of the Soul has been viewed as distinct
from the irrational.
Now, taking these into consideration, there is thought
to be a possibility of injustice towards one’s
self, because herein it is possible for men to suffer
somewhat in contradiction of impulses really their
own; and so it is thought that there is Just of a certain
kind between these parts mutually, as between ruler
and ruled.
Let this then be accepted as an account of the distinctions
which we recognise respecting Justice and the rest
of the moral virtues.
BOOK VI
I having stated in a former part of this treatise
that men should choose the mean instead of either
the excess or defect, and that the mean is according
to the dictates of Right Reason; we will now proceed
to explain this term.
For in all the habits which we have expressly mentioned,
as likewise in all the others, there is, so to speak,
a mark with his eye fixed on which the man who has
Reason tightens or slacks his rope; and there is a
certain limit of those mean states which we say are
in accordance with Right Reason, and lie between excess
on the one hand and defect on the other.
Now to speak thus is true enough but conveys no very
definite meaning: as, in fact, in all other pursuits
requiring attention and diligence on which skill and
science are brought to bear; it is quite true of course
to say that men are neither to labour nor relax too
much or too little, but in moderation, and as Right
Reason directs; yet if this were all a man had he
would not be greatly the wiser; as, for instance, if
in answer to the question, what are proper applications
to the body, he were to be told, “Oh! of course,
whatever the science of medicine, and in such manner
as the physician, directs.”
