[Footnote c: It may, however, be doubted whether
this rational and self-guiding conviction arouses
as much fervor or enthusiastic devotedness in men
as their first dogmatical belief.]
When the liberty of the press acts upon men who are
in the first of these three states, it does not immediately
disturb their habit of believing implicitly without
investigation, but it constantly modifies the objects
of their intuitive convictions. The human mind
continues to discern but one point upon the whole
intellectual horizon, and that point is in continual
motion. Such are the symptoms of sudden revolutions,
and of the misfortunes which are sure to befall those
generations which abruptly adopt the unconditional
freedom of the press.
The circle of novel ideas is, however, soon terminated;
the touch of experience is upon them, and the doubt
and mistrust which their uncertainty produces become
universal. We may rest assured that the majority
of mankind will either believe they know not wherefore,
or will not know what to believe. Few are the
beings who can ever hope to attain to that state of
rational and independent conviction which true knowledge
can beget in defiance of the attacks of doubt.
It has been remarked that in times of great religious
fervor men sometimes change their religious opinions;
whereas in times of general scepticism everyone clings
to his own persuasion. The same thing takes place
in politics under the liberty of the press. In
countries where all the theories of social science
have been contested in their turn, the citizens who
have adopted one of them stick to it, not so much because
they are assured of its excellence, as because they
are not convinced of the superiority of any other.
In the present age men are not very ready to die in
defence of their opinions, but they are rarely inclined
to change them; and there are fewer martyrs as well
as fewer apostates.
Another still more valid reason may yet be adduced:
when no abstract opinions are looked upon as certain,
men cling to the mere propensities and external interests
of their position, which are naturally more tangible
and more permanent than any opinions in the world.
It is not a question of easy solution whether aristocracy
or democracy is most fit to govern a country.
But it is certain that democracy annoys one part of
the community, and that aristocracy oppresses another
part. When the question is reduced to the simple
expression of the struggle between poverty and wealth,
the tendency of each side of the dispute becomes perfectly
evident without further controversy.
Chapter Summary
Daily use which the Anglo-Americans make of the right
of association—Three kinds of political
associations—In what manner the Americans
apply the representative system to associations—Dangers
resulting to the State—Great Convention
of 1831 relative to the Tariff—Legislative
character of this Convention—Why the unlimited
exercise of the right of association is less dangerous
in the United States than elsewhere—Why
it may be looked upon as necessary—Utility
of associations in a democratic people.
